I dont imagine my word would mean much on this but, I remember when I was first starting on this debate around ten years ago there was a fellow I used to see at my local comic book shop back in California. I showed him some prints of Wayne Poes arguments and latter Mike Wongs, He tried to make me understand why they were wrong from his point of view all of which flew over my head at the time. I came to learn that fellow worked at a place called Rocketdyne;
I cant know what he actually did there but the things he covered led me to believe that it was more than just playing with copy machines. I wonder would Mr. Wong take the word of an actual rocket scientist if he disagreed with him?
At any rate I personly think that Mr. Wong cherry-picks all the 'evidence' that he uses because I see too much that is simply ignored, but as I pointed out, in the area of tactics he has a lot to learn. Most of the tactics he posted in his various essays start at the assumption that the tech in wars is superior in every way and doesnt even leave room for the possibility that his foe may have an ace up his sleeve. From his point of view, the argument I just made is the 'usual' trekkie, " they'll figure something out I just know it" meme. But the fact is his tactics as he has them written up on his board are rigged in the extreame, it's like reading tactical plans from World War One! He doesnt allow for any flexability or for unknown factors that might hamper his strategy, he simply assumes that all will go as planned, he's failed already and he doesnt even know it. I was surprised when I read this from his naval tactics page
In the 19th century, naval warfare entered the age of the iron-hulled steam-driven battleship. Large battles of this era involved even fewer ships than battles involving ships of the line: a handful of battleships with a destroyer screen was now regarded as a fleet. These ships had the range of sailing ships without their dependence on the wind, and they mounted both superior armour and firepower. Two important new technologies appeared: fire control and torpedoes. Fire control meant that they could aim without a line of sight by using ballistic trajectory calculations, and it greatly increased their effective weapon range. This range virtually eliminated the importance of fleet formations, since the distances between ship in an enemy fleet were now so small (relative to weapon range) that you could direct and concentrate your firepower toward any arbitrary point in the enemy fleet. It was for this reason that fleets in the battleship era cruised in formation but immediately broke up into columns when an enemy was sighted. Torpedoes struck the heavily armoured battleships below the waterline and could sink them, so protective destroyer screens appeared. Visibility and adequate scouting gained even more importance, and both were eventually aided by the invention of radar. The so-called "N-square law" meant that the fleet with an initial advantage would enjoy an increasing advantage as the battle wore on, due to the effect of attrition. Tactics of maneuver shrank in importance; despite the theoretical effectiveness of "crossing the T", it almost never happened and proved to be largely irrelevant. Tactics of this era were dominated by the big gun, and since the tactics of maneuver were no longer important, battles of this era were characterized by ruthlessly simple mathematics regardless of whether they took place at long range or short range: the fleet with superior numbers and firepower would generally be assured of victory, particularly if they could strike first.
Obviously heâ€™s never heard of the battle of Jutland which easily disproves nearly everything he has written above. All battleships and battle cruisers doing everything he says ships of that era didnâ€™t do. Or how about the battle of Tsushima, when the Japanese imperial fleet sunk the Russian navy in exactly the same way he insist they no longer operated.
He supposedly contacted someone in order to get this information, either they lied to him or he wasnâ€™t paying any attention to what he was being told.
I will spot him the part about columns but I dont think he knows why the columns are used or even recognize the fact that it's still a form of maneuver tactics which he seems to think is obsolete;
Battle lines are not used. Fleets travel in formation which break up when combat is joined, as seen in ROTJ. The Rebel and Imperial fleets began exchanging long-range fire without any regard for formation, although Emperor Palpatine's decisions ultimately led to an Imperial defeat despite what was probably superior firepower. Piett's ships engaged long-range fire with the Rebel fleet as described in the ROTJ novelization, but they apparently targeted smaller ships before larger ships for the purpose of prolonging Palpatine's dramatic demonstration. Even Jerjerrod chose his targets in the same manner, aiming the first superlaser blast at the Liberty rather than the far more massive and heavily armed Rebel flagship Home One. On the other hand, Ackbar wisely concentrated his fleet's firepower on the Imperial flagship Executor first..
Tactics of maneuver are non-existent. Capital ships simply exchange fire with enemy capital ships, without regard for formations or "flanking", "encirclement", or "breakthrough" maneuvers.
Did he ever stop to think that maybe the reason why they dont maneuver is because their ships cant? Battle lines are not used because the ships lack the maneuverability to make them effective, tactics of maneuver are not used because the ships lack real maneuverability, a horrible design flaw forcing them to sit there and trade shots and try to upkeep their vessel until one of them is destroyed.
Imperial naval tactics are largely based on the battleship era, with some hint of tactics from the early aircraft carrier era.
Actually imperial naval tactics have very little in common with any era of naval warfare. The closest analogy I can think of would be the early ironclad era, but even those ships used maneuver tactics so it's an imperfect fit.