Guard Doctrine analyses

[Mr. Oragahn]

Indeed it's a huge post, but it's nothing new to me, although I'm trying to stop getting stuck into post marathons myself so... ^_^'
I'm not sure if I can just answer your last post or take a bite at your bigger one.
I notice that there are questions which seems to stem from a slight misunderstanding between us.

Condensing the rather mammoth post above:

1. I would like to see what posts of Deadguy lead you to believe he is indicating rough parity in WWII doctrine or that trench warfare breaks out due to parity of forces.

What do you mean by "rough parity in WWII doctrine"?
Is it parity between firepower and attrition (as understood then, or now)?

2. Reason or evidence why you feel dispersing your forces along static defense would be a effective allocation of resources between two roughly equal foes.

I believe that at some point, the defenses are so big and robust and anything you can move isn't going to put a dent in it, save nuclear firepower. Surely, a small wall isn't anything a company cannot overcome, but in WH40K they manage to get stuck into situations where they clearly can't find a way to penetrate the enemy's position, now a bastion btw, no matter how much units are concentrated.
These are, of course, specific scenarii, cases where the authors of fluff or novels decided to give us historical examples of ridiculous situations when defenses have been established and are now tight to push through.
It still takes less complexity to dig holes, plant dumb mines and concrete walls than entire legions of tanks and other funny things.
For example the Maginot line, had it been correctly capped everywhere (Ardennes) and extended high enough along Belgium (by disregarding diplomatic etiquette), in a way similar to how Italy was so many bisected by other lines, would have stood formidably well.
Technically, the Maginot line was not a failure. Where it was completed and present, it worked like wonders.
Plus the Maginot line was indeed quite capable of giving the army on defense time to adjust and gather units where needed. In fact, the line stood formidably against ALL German attacks, no matter the caliber they used. Oh it had some flaws, like the fact that infantry could sometimes get close enough as to plant bombs on turrets. But that's about it.

Then let's add to this element, regardless of the industrial and logistical realities of that particular time, the idea that if the French forces had more tanks on their side, notably more of those terrifying and brutish B1s, no matter their flaws (fixed high caliber frontal cannon and oil hog for anything treads concerned), it's possible that both sides would have been dramatically stuck.
To give an idea of what the B1 tank was capable of, see this:

Billotte is known for his extraordinary actions on 16 May 1940 during the battle at the French village of Stonne. Billotte served in the 1st Compagnie of the 41st Tank Battalion, equipped with the Char B1 heavy tank. Then-Captain Billotte, commanding a Char B1 Bis tank nicknamed "Eure", was instrumental in capturing the village of Stonne, defended by elements of the German 8th Panzer Regiment. The village had already been the scene of fierce fighting before Billotte's action, having changed hands numerous times and lying on a strategic location on the road to Sedan. On 16 May, while under heavy fire from German tanks, Billotte and his B1 Bis managed to break through the German defences and to destroy two German PzKpfw IV tanks, eleven PzKpfw III tanks and two enemy guns. Billotte's Char B1-Bis tank received 140 hits from enemy tanks and guns, but none were able to penetrate the tank's heavy armour.

It's even possible that a complete line would have given proper time for the Allies to implement radios in their mechanized units while the Germans would have found their run into enemy territory an impossible task, humiliating both Guderian and Manstein, and would have returned to a classic battle of complete destruction.
The idea here is that at some point, the defenses clearly surpass what the enemy can concentrate at any point.

For example, in 40K, there's the Vraks case which is a total cluster fuck of possibly every reason being packaged as to bring both sides to an absurd halt, like having to attack a huge cityhive defended by its own energy shield and capable of replying to your firepower, so much that all you can do is hope sending enough units, on and on, in the hope that at some point, the grinding will bring the enemy to its knees as it shall run low on resources.

3. Evidence it is this parity of forces which prompts the Guard to fght WWI style rather than internal issues which hinder them. Poor training, crippling bureacracy, poor logistics etc.

One of the quotes provided by Deadguy clearly shows that when the armoured spearhead is met with equal armour, you slam a wrench in the cogs.
Now, we cannot make generalities.
I don't know what brought certain armies to dig trenches and never claimed that WWI trench digging was always what would happen.

I'd also want to point out that the question of maneuvering is certainly not something strictly modern, but it's modern technology that allows to obtain information, filter it and dispatch the necessary data to mobile units on the ground, capable of moving where needed, concentrating firepower and reacting fast, and then redeploy elsewhere.
It's a question of gathering, computation and flux of data more than anything else, and on this point there still are some oddities that should -I stress on should- allow the Imperial Guard to do well enough.
See, they have aircrafts which can obtain information. They have auspex, and it seems they use a ton of them when they have the resources. I've read that they also have some other radar systems.

The real question, then, is how they gather the information in detail, how it's managed, who supervises that operation and how, and who is on the receiving end to put into motion the relevant data and get the job done.
We'd have to look into details at the squad level or higher when requiring data for mobile divisions. I understand that there are plenty of those Admech technicians, utmost necessary to activate all those engines and "speak" to them. And these guys are cyborgs, with all stuff planted in them.
There's no reason why the IG can't locate every single unit, at least mechanized ones and any group that counts at least one admech tech.

So some of the reasons as to why this army is limited are to be found elsewhere. I listed several of them in a reply to G. Donner.

[sonofccn]

I'm not sure if I can just answer your last post or take a bite at your bigger one.

Well whatever you feel is most prudent. I personally believe the "mini-post" contains the heart of the discussion.

1.

What do you mean by "rough parity in WWII doctrine"?
Is it parity between firepower and attrition (as understood then, or now)?

Forgive my imprecise language. I merely meant tactics and doctrines which would be comparable to those employed in WWII. Such as I believe you have advocated and suggested Deadguy similarly did so.

2.

I believe that at some point, the defenses are so big and robust and anything you can move isn't going to put a dent in it, save nuclear firepower.

I’m not sure any fortification has ever been built to such specifications. Your two examples, the Winter Line and Pomerania Wall, both were ultimately breached by allied forces unless I’m misunderstanding something.

It still takes less complexity to dig holes, plant dumb mines and concrete walls than entire legions of tanks and other funny things.

They may be more simplistic in design but they are still man-hour and resource intensive no less when you are attempting it on such a scale. Further such resources committed are less flexible than “legions of tanks”.

For example the Maginot line, had it been correctly capped everywhere (Ardennes) and extended high enough along Belgium (by disregarding diplomatic etiquette), in a way similar to how Italy was so many bisected by other lines, would have stood formidably well. Technically, the Maginot line was not a failure. Where it was completed and present, it worked like wonders.

I do not share such optimism. The line predominantly was not attacked during the battle for France which would make drawing conclusions from it difficult. As well here shows how the Germans managed to achieve some limited penetration as it was.

Then let's add to this element, regardless of the industrial and logistical realities of that particular time, the idea that if the French forces had more tanks on their side, notably more of those terrifying and brutish B1s, no matter their flaws (fixed high caliber frontal cannon and oil hog for anything treads concerned), it's possible that both sides would have been dramatically stuck.

The allies did have more tanks than the Germans, almost all of them heavier armed and armored as well, through I don’t know the ratio of B1’s to the rest.

It's even possible that a complete line would have given proper time for the Allies to implement radios in their mechanized units while the Germans would have found their run into enemy territory an impossible task, humiliating both Guderian and Manstein, and would have returned to a classic battle of complete destruction.
The idea here is that at some point, the defenses clearly surpass what the enemy can concentrate at any point.

Such as it is the Germans did manage to break through in places after only days of combat. As well regarding the Winter Line its assault was conducted at least initially in the winter and in mountainous terrain which always make things difficult. I don’t think it as total or the Gustav line individual could be taken as a typical save for areas of similar terrain. Simply put considering that in the OT Germany spent months in preparations shifting their army into position and that unless I’m mistaken most of the front in question is more optimal for combat than it was in “Germany’s rocky underbelly” I don’t think you’ll have as much time as your hoping for.


Now then since you have stated your case I’ll make mine. In place of concrete bunkers and fields of razor wire I’d invest my resources into the army the Germans attacked with in the OT placing any remainder leftover first in equipping my infantry with sufficient these to make them mobile and keep up with my tanks, lessening their vulnerability to counter-attacker, then in strengthening the strategic limb of my air-power. Ideally I’d want something B-17ish, or B-29 as long as I’m speaking of my ideal desire, through I’ll likely have to settle for Heinkel bombers both for helping me blowing up fixed fortifications as well as disruption/destruction of assets in the rear of the enemy.

For the basic battle plan I’ve divide my strike force into two separate tangents hitting distant ends of the fortified line forcing you to divide your battle forces with each tangent in turn divided again into a pair of “spearheads” which will pierce through ultimately encircling and cutting off the defenders leaving them to rot on the vine so to speak. During which my airpower will wrestle air superiority allowing both tactical and strategic bombing missions both against the defensive line itself and “soft” targets in the interior. Bridges, rail lines etc which medium bombers should at least be able to annoy further disrupting enemy army movements which will be harried by the tactical element. This I feel maximizes my advantages, speed/force concentration, and your disadvantages, dispersal of force/limited mobility, to their utmost.

3.

One of the quotes provided by Deadguy clearly shows that when the armoured spearhead is met with equal armour, you slam a wrench in the cogs.

Strictly speaking it says mobile reserves which can be taken as things which can move as opposed to static defense. And the fact the Imperial Guard switches to attrition is not evidence raw parity of force is the cause rather than inherent issues within the Guard. Indeed the fact they expect and may indeed plan on the enemy being able to bring reinforcements to the battlefield indicates some issue with the concept of maneuver warfare. Evidence would be needed to show the Guard are fully capable of conducting war of maneuver as the Germans and or Soviets managed during the war then show how this is curtailed by enemy action and how its applicable to blitzkrieg/deep battle.

I don't know what brought certain armies to dig trenches and never claimed that WWI trench digging was always what would happen.

Its more than just the odd army through. Vraks was essentially a reconstruction of the Western Front and it was deemed nigh impervious to assault. It is a tactically viable act within the 40k universe. As well even without trenches there is still the matter of a slower tempo, more static warfare which the guard, with exceptions, seem to conduct their operations.

I'd also want to point out that the question of maneuvering is certainly not something strictly modern, but it's modern technology that allows to obtain information, filter it and dispatch the necessary data to mobile units on the ground, capable of moving where needed, concentrating firepower and reacting fast, and then redeploy elsewhere.

Such tech is indeed useful but without a doctrine to support it all such fancy gizmos are just toys. As well I’ve mostly talked of and made comparisons to operations of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union undertaken during the War. Neither of which would qualify as modern by our standards or possessing highly advanced technology.

It's a question of gathering, computation and flux of data more than anything else, and on this point there still are some oddities that should -I stress on should- allow the Imperial Guard to do well enough.

But that’s the issue. What the Guard “should” be able to do and what they are capable of are divergent. Off hand I don’t think there are any technological reasons to prevent the Guard from fighting similar the German army circa 1940, the Russ isn’t much slower than a Panzer III for instance, and combeads/voxs seem omnipresent enough for similar coordination. Yet, overall, they do not fight as such.

See, they have aircrafts which can obtain information.

They have ground attack aircraft I’m not sure they have recon/surveillance planes or the ability to send any captured information to the leaders of the groundpounders in the front opposed to higher echelon officers in the rear.

They have auspex, and it seems they use a ton of them when they have the resources. I've read that they also have some other radar systems.

Any particular examples? I don’t recall heavy sensor use on Vraks, which should have been quite well supplied, or Taros through perhaps I overlooked such.

The real question, then, is how they gather the information in detail, how it's managed, who supervises that operation and how, and who is on the receiving end to put into motion the relevant data and get the job done.

Well ideally yes through the limited nature of what we have to work with it is more practical to work from how we see the Guard in operation rather than anything else.

We'd have to look into details at the squad level or higher when requiring data for mobile divisions. I understand that there are plenty of those Admech technicians, utmost necessary to activate all those engines and "speak" to them. And these guys are cyborgs, with all stuff planted in them.
There's no reason why the IG can't locate every single unit, at least mechanized ones and any group that counts at least one admech tech.

I’m not sure what you mean by “to activate”. It sounds like your saying the Admech have to personally start each and every machine in the field or at least they require a very noticeable presence among “mechanized” regiments in order to maintain it. Is that a correct summation.

[Mr. Oragahn]

What do you mean by "rough parity in WWII doctrine"?
Is it parity between firepower and attrition (as understood then, or now)?

Forgive my imprecise language. I merely meant tactics and doctrines which would be comparable to those employed in WWII. Such as I believe you have advocated and suggested Deadguy similarly did so.

Ok, then as an answer to this question:

"1. I would like to see what posts of Deadguy lead you to believe he is indicating rough parity in WWII doctrine or that trench warfare breaks out due to parity of forces."

Basically, found from the quotations of Deadguy's essential first two posts:

The Chimera is the Imperial Guard’s most numerous armoured troop carrier and infantry support vehicle, and the vehicle with which most Guardsmen will be best acquainted. It can carry a full squad and one passenger (most often an officer, commissar or priest) plus its own crew. In fast moving battles, the Chimera can transport its infantry squad for many miles and this mobility is essential to the fast moving warfare that typifies an Imperial Guard attack, but is less useful in urban fighting and static defence.

[...]

Clearly there is, in that source at least, a distinction made by a fast attack possibility and one where all fights are reduced to a crawl, either in an urban environment or anything even more static, like some glorified line/trench warfare.

Plus this excerpt, notably the last line:



And other bits. There's the idea that the IG engages large amounts of power, concentrated if possible, and lets the reserve finish the job while the spearhead are here to weaken and divide the enemy force and preventing organization.
When the enemy engages his own mobile forces (which include missile launching platforms apparently), the IG's doctrine still gives it the initiative to force the enemy to a battle of attrition, where all units will be destroyed, instead of merely hitting the "nervous center".

Let's notice that this is grimdark 40K though. Unless the IG engages dissenting human forces, their most numerous enemies are hardly known to surrender. Orks, Tyranids, Chaos, they all seem to go for attrition.
There's a subtlety with the Orks though, as depending on the source, killing the Boss will lead to infighting or immediate replacement by a new badass Ork. Eldars also are dedicate and at best what the IG can get is the enemy fleeing, which is another solution to a battle.

I'd rather hear from you what you makes you think there's no such rough parity between "blitz" runs or crawlish battles. I think it's pretty clear that there is such a thing.

Besides, WWII is hard to analyze. The evolution within the war had been truly massive. A point I'll return to below.

I believe that at some point, the defenses are so big and robust and anything you can move isn't going to put a dent in it, save nuclear firepower.

I’m not sure any fortification has ever been built to such specifications. Your two examples, the Winter Line and Pomerania Wall, both were ultimately breached by allied forces unless I’m misunderstanding something.

The winter line was nothing fancy. The Pomerania Wall had strong points but the Axis forces here were just not enough.

It still takes less complexity to dig holes, plant dumb mines and concrete walls than entire legions of tanks and other funny things.

They may be more simplistic in design but they are still man-hour and resource intensive no less when you are attempting it on such a scale. Further such resources committed are less flexible than “legions of tanks”.

Tanks require much more resources at every point of their existence, and as many men to work endlessly on their birthing and maintenance.
Reinforced or plain concrete, padding, some sheets of iron if needed at some point and holes dug in the dirt cost little to nothing once there. They're also less complex to build and require less intricate resources.
Cannons are the most complicated pieces of the static defenses and still are the most robust of the mechanized elements. Heck, even the old unshielded or breakless Dutch cannons would, by virtue of being half sheated in concrete, work way better than they would on the field in the open.
Tanks, on the other hand, were sources of massive hairpulling logistic issues for both sides.
German tanks were even more problematic somehow since they often carried one more crew member than Allies tanks. This was a good advantage on the field, but that's just another anvil in the cost.

Regarding static defense, it is only recently that bunker busters have become so potent that bunkers are nearly useless unless massively reinforced, deeper and having some structure on the surface to deviate the trajectory of the falling projectile in order to nullify part of its potency due to sheer momentum.
In WWII, the most reinforced sections of the greater defensive lines were virtually undefeatable. The Maginot line's best forts were either taken down after a massive concerted effort from the German forces (and at this point the French forces were just not operated, largely leaving the forts alone), or simply never taken down, with the French troops inside asked to surrender once the political authority fell.
Now there were design flaws in the line, but it still worked wonders for what it was supposed to do. Safe that the stupid large gaps, of course. Either you build a medium line that's going to let you build time by delaying the enemy in order to allow you to organize your forces, or you plan a full static defense, but you do it completely. The French central command's dogma was completely half arsed. There.
Then, we get back to the point of evoluion. People say that money should have been saved to build tanks and planes. They just forget that when the line was started and finished (~28 to 35), the vehicles built then would have been more of the same level of shit that didn't suffice. No radio, no real armour, no heavy cannons, and all the other deficiencies of that time. In other words, massive amounts of wasted money and metal.
The real "gems", the B1s, were too slow to come. Although that alongside the Brits' Matilda II, they were true beasts. I mean, 60 mm or armour on the front, nearly as much on the sides (and they even had a planned flank armour of 70 mm O_O'), plus the front cannon which many German tanks lacked. Add the fact that in general the main hulls were predominantly cast instead and lightly riveted, that made them even tougher than their German counterparts, which went for rivets galore.
But there just weren't enough of 'em and that had a huge cost as well.

For example the Maginot line, had it been correctly capped everywhere (Ardennes) and extended high enough along Belgium (by disregarding diplomatic etiquette), in a way similar to how Italy was so many bisected by other lines, would have stood formidably well. Technically, the Maginot line was not a failure. Where it was completed and present, it worked like wonders.

I do not share such optimism. The line predominantly was not attacked during the battle for France which would make drawing conclusions from it difficult. As well here shows how the Germans managed to achieve some limited penetration as it was.

You got to love the fucking huge size of that bore. :D

Outside of any strategical considerations (the bluff of Group C near the line), the point is that the line was largely avoided precisely because the German forces would have broke their teeth on it and that would have been completely detrimental to their strategy, which was absolutely required considering the real "quality" of German tanks back in 40. What made them superior was the ubiquity of radio through all mechanized units, even the smallest, and the dissociated driving and aiming of the main cannon. But not their firepower or armour.
As you can see in the article, the vast majority of the "forts" to fell were actually small structures, many located along the weakest sections of the line. Many forts were taken by the "simple" action of infantry, even on completely open lands.

Then let's add to this element, regardless of the industrial and logistical realities of that particular time, the idea that if the French forces had more tanks on their side, notably more of those terrifying and brutish B1s, no matter their flaws (fixed high caliber frontal cannon and oil hog for anything treads concerned), it's possible that both sides would have been dramatically stuck.

The allies did have more tanks than the Germans, almost all of them heavier armed and armored as well, through I don’t know the ratio of B1’s to the rest.

This position needs refinement. Aside from the idea that quantity is a quality of its own, the German forces were much more "modern warfare" than anything the Allies came with. So only a swarm of armour could hope to compensate the difference of efficiency and action-reaction. There's indeed a point when even fine tech and faster reflexes doesn't undo sheer overnumbering.
Now, I'm basing this on how they used the Allies, especially the French, used their units. Why I say moar tanks is to compensate for the deficiency in their doctrine. One of the main problems of Belgian and French forces was the composition of their divisions. The motorization was rather, err... not really homogeneous. Meaning that when things started to move fast, the lack of "elite" divisions and the generalization of the messy jack of all trades resulted in groups literally stretching. With the problem of communication endemic to the Allies' forces, this was a total disaster.
Meaning that unless we suddenly make all units better, a rather obtuse but mathematically correct way to even the problem would require multiplying the number of already existing units, so at least there would still be more of the best units of each group.
Now, the B1s were quite better and also had the radio.
I mean, it's either more numbers or a near complete revamp of the Allies or at least French and Belgian forces.
I guess you could equally go with the full revamp. All in all, both scenario are completely made up and, as I alluded to in my previous post, fantaisies.

It's even possible that a complete line would have given proper time for the Allies to implement radios in their mechanized units while the Germans would have found their run into enemy territory an impossible task, humiliating both Guderian and Manstein, and would have returned to a classic battle of complete destruction.
The idea here is that at some point, the defenses clearly surpass what the enemy can concentrate at any point.

Such as it is the Germans did manage to break through in places after only days of combat. As well regarding the Winter Line its assault was conducted at least initially in the winter and in mountainous terrain which always make things difficult. I don’t think it as total or the Gustav line individual could be taken as a typical save for areas of similar terrain. Simply put considering that in the OT Germany spent months in preparations shifting their army into position and that unless I’m mistaken most of the front in question is more optimal for combat than it was in “Germany’s rocky underbelly” I don’t think you’ll have as much time as your hoping for.

At least regarding the French, the problem was that they clearly didn't go with either A or B. They had tons of mothballed forces and a slowly ramping up industry. They had planned on a long war (all relative, several years, not mere months) and knew that under such conditions they'd have no issue getting what they needed as long as they could count on their super duper wall of balls. Trouble is, they believed in some kind of perverted version of the initial concept behind the Maginot line. They had become slaves to their own creation, putting too much faith in its deterrence capacity without keeping an eye on the organization required to meet the new evolution of military doctrine in 40. Instead of going with a defensive organization and an industry potent enough at first to require little to be activated, increased and mobilized, they really put their development to a crawl while not completing the defensive line that would have given them the right to do so. They just did it all wrong, probably because they didn't want to fight. Out of WWI, and now with enough economical wealth they didn't want to risk, they didn't give themselves the tools for victory.

Now then since you have stated your case I’ll make mine. In place of concrete bunkers and fields of razor wire I’d invest my resources into the army the Germans attacked with in the OT placing any remainder leftover first in equipping my infantry with sufficient these to make them mobile and keep up with my tanks, lessening their vulnerability to counter-attacker, then in strengthening the strategic limb of my air-power. Ideally I’d want something B-17ish, or B-29 as long as I’m speaking of my ideal desire, through I’ll likely have to settle for Heinkel bombers both for helping me blowing up fixed fortifications as well as disruption/destruction of assets in the rear of the enemy.

Well, I believe that the Heinkel He-111 was quite sluggish, had poor defensive weaponry and a too limited bomb load capacity.
Besides, you wouldn't be building them or equivalents between 1928 and 1935. You'd be outputting more of the stuff that wouldn't win you battles, but only maintain control over... controlled space.

But let's assume you got those vehicles.

For the basic battle plan I’ve divide my strike force into two separate tangents hitting distant ends of the fortified line forcing you to divide your battle forces with each tangent in turn divided again into a pair of “spearheads” which will pierce through ultimately encircling and cutting off the defenders leaving them to rot on the vine so to speak. During which my airpower will wrestle air superiority allowing both tactical and strategic bombing missions both against the defensive line itself and “soft” targets in the interior. Bridges, rail lines etc which medium bombers should at least be able to annoy further disrupting enemy army movements which will be harried by the tactical element. This I feel maximizes my advantages, speed/force concentration, and your disadvantages, dispersal of force/limited mobility, to their utmost.

Are you portraying a fair scenario or not? Because all of this is a presentation of a win-win case.
You attack two distant points in the line; you break them.
Your planes attack; they can bombard the line, its fortresses and even get beyond the line, hitting anything soft and other key points for movement (bridges, etc.).

That's fine, but what is the point?
Why the defense doesn't possess mobile forces combining long range artillery, anti-tank guns and tanks and anti-aircraft pieces?
Why are the fortresses incapable of firing at the planes, and why isn't there anything behind the wall to shoot down the planes?

Anyway, I think this is severely digressing from the initial topic.

One of the quotes provided by Deadguy clearly shows that when the armoured spearhead is met with equal armour, you slam a wrench in the cogs.

Strictly speaking it says mobile reserves which can be taken as things which can move as opposed to static defense. And the fact the Imperial Guard switches to attrition is not evidence raw parity of force is the cause rather than inherent issues within the Guard. Indeed the fact they expect and may indeed plan on the enemy being able to bring reinforcements to the battlefield indicates some issue with the concept of maneuver warfare. Evidence would be needed to show the Guard are fully capable of conducting war of maneuver as the Germans and or Soviets managed during the war then show how this is curtailed by enemy action and how its applicable to blitzkrieg/deep battle.

You mean the fact that they enter a battle of attrition, when their first armour lines meet equally potent armoured divisions, is a question of doctrine more than anything else?
And do we have any evidence that they don't try to outmaneuver their enemies?
Not sure I'm following you here.

We haven't even proved that the IG can't do modern warfare, with all its advanced systems, when it can claim orbital or air superiority, thus benefiting a hawk's eye view of the battlefield.
We haven't figure out how data is managed at all.
I'm still reading Ralson's thread, I'll have to return to Deadguy's later on, and perhaps even read one of Connor's thread to pay attention to things I wasn't really interested in before (as my main problem back then was to largely debunk the gross claims regarding the firepower of spaceships, ground and air vehicles or infantry weapons).

I'd also want to point out that the question of maneuvering is certainly not something strictly modern, but it's modern technology that allows to obtain information, filter it and dispatch the necessary data to mobile units on the ground, capable of moving where needed, concentrating firepower and reacting fast, and then redeploy elsewhere.

Such tech is indeed useful but without a doctrine to support it all such fancy gizmos are just toys. As well I’ve mostly talked of and made comparisons to operations of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union undertaken during the War. Neither of which would qualify as modern by our standards or possessing highly advanced technology.

It's probably best to return to the doctrinal question of the Imperial Guard once we have a complete view of the
They clearly opt for a more versatile and robust doctrine of numbers and massed numbers than trying to move and snipe, although they could do it if they had the appropriate sensor tech and network infrastructure.
Notice that all their infantry can be carried by very mobile transports. These transports also carry very potent weapons. All these vehicles have at the very least radios, which is nothing inferior to the tech used in current "modern warfare".

It seems to me that what sticks in the subconscious of 40K is a redux of the Red Army at Stalingrad, with future tech.
But there seems to be little incentive to consider the possibility that these typical, eponimous battle scenarios are not necessarily the norm, and even perhaps cherry picked cases which fit the most with the desperate mood of 40K.

Let's also consider something interesting. In Ralson's thread, there came a post of his where he was citing IXJac from another thread pitting the US forces against the IG.
IXJac made his point and proved that the US forces used a vast complex of networks to win their battles (which they don't always win: see Afghanistan, despite the really archaïc forces of the enemy).
But one of his opponent was right in proving that a large part of this superioty was only possible because of said networks, exposed stations and a vast collection of satellites. Which means total orbital superiority, because the enemy can't shoot down satellites, nor can penetrate the US' aerial zone and take down the radar arrays.
But what goes if the IG obtains orbital superiority? Not only their ships can see everything and send back all information, but they obviously bust all satellites and all radar stations on the ground. Suddenly, the super advanced but massively fragile US army is blind and mute.

To me, the IG doctrine is robust because it will work very well on worlds where neither forces can have total orbital superiority.
It turns out that the context is extremely important.

The guides and quotations really give general ideas, but for the moment I'm yet to read something that goes into details as to how the IG behaves depending on the nature of the target, its defenses, its mobility and networks, and the null, partial or complete control of space or air.

It's a question of gathering, computation and flux of data more than anything else, and on this point there still are some oddities that should -I stress on should- allow the Imperial Guard to do well enough.

But that’s the issue. What the Guard “should” be able to do and what they are capable of are divergent. Off hand I don’t think there are any technological reasons to prevent the Guard from fighting similar the German army circa 1940, the Russ isn’t much slower than a Panzer III for instance, and combeads/voxs seem omnipresent enough for similar coordination. Yet, overall, they do not fight as such.

See, they have aircrafts which can obtain information.

They have ground attack aircraft I’m not sure they have recon/surveillance planes or the ability to send any captured information to the leaders of the groundpounders in the front opposed to higher echelon officers in the rear.

They have auspex, and it seems they use a ton of them when they have the resources. I've read that they also have some other radar systems.

Any particular examples? I don’t recall heavy sensor use on Vraks, which should have been quite well supplied, or Taros through perhaps I overlooked such.

No examples, unfortunately. I'm not knowledgeable enough here. I read it in Ralson's thread I believe.
Therefore, let's just keep that in the back of our minds, just in case.

The real question, then, is how they gather the information in detail, how it's managed, who supervises that operation and how, and who is on the receiving end to put into motion the relevant data and get the job done.

Well ideally yes through the limited nature of what we have to work with it is more practical to work from how we see the Guard in operation rather than anything else.

This is where we should be looking at a variety of battle cases. If you want to properly cover your topic, that's what will happen one day or another. How much have you read of the fluff or novels?

We'd have to look into details at the squad level or higher when requiring data for mobile divisions. I understand that there are plenty of those Admech technicians, utmost necessary to activate all those engines and "speak" to them. And these guys are cyborgs, with all stuff planted in them.
There's no reason why the IG can't locate every single unit, at least mechanized ones and any group that counts at least one admech tech.

I’m not sure what you mean by “to activate”. It sounds like your saying the Admech have to personally start each and every machine in the field or at least they require a very noticeable presence among “mechanized” regiments in order to maintain it. Is that a correct summation.

Yes, machines are generally activated by runic interfaces and even chants that only the admech produce, iirc. Even Space Marine weapons have to be blessed, although I don't think those infantry weapons have any requirement for activation.
But I'm sure that equipment for vehicles such as transports, tanks, titans and then large industrial structures with a modicum of automation require admech and their voodoo.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

There is something that really needs to be pointed out. Contrary to the Soviets at Stalingrad or both Allies and Axis forces around 39~41, the vast ajority of IG mechanized units are reliable and have a high endurance outside of combat (or even in combat). All soldiers can be assured of being given the bare equipment that's still plain enough to shoot nasty things down. In comparison, the percentages of soldiers who had been badly or underequipped on all sides was staggering during the beginning of WWII. The Imperium's industry is quite robbust there. For a reason, of course: there's no notable tech evoluion and it holds many many industrial worlds churning out the weapons, vehicles and equipment day after day.

The real Imperium's ground warfare shouldn't be measured to the IG only. The paradigm needs to encompass more. It is not just how the IG operates, but the idea of that a real proper use of Imperium ground forces should always be a mixture of Space Marines supported by the Imperial Guard. The Space Marines would occupy something like the spearhead role and help give the IG a boost in mobility and penetration, as to mirror for example the spread of resources and technology in the German forces: instead of spreading motorization everywhere everytime, which their industry couldn't hold, they chose to focus their industry on fewer units, while giving them the best stuff, and thus putting a large number of divisions on foot or on horses (iirc there were nearly twice more horses used by the Germans in early WWII than during WWI, and with infantry + horses that should be above 80%, perhaps nearing 90%).
It is this impressive difference of power and mobility which should, somehow, serve as the model here. The high quality being a mix of Space Marines and Terminators plus some Chimeras and other Land Raiders, and eventually a small supplement of high quality IG vehicles, while the rest, the meat, the vast bulk of IG forces, gets the basic stuff.

[General Donner]

Forgive me for jumping in and out of the discussion, and for heavy snipping. I just can't deal with the entirety of the huge posts you two generate ... :D

Ok, then as an answer to this question:

"1. I would like to see what posts of Deadguy lead you to believe he is indicating rough parity in WWII doctrine or that trench warfare breaks out due to parity of forces."

Basically, found from the quotations of Deadguy's essential first two posts:

Imperial Munitorum Manual page 7 wrote:

The Chimera is the Imperial Guard’s most numerous armoured troop carrier and infantry support vehicle, and the vehicle with which most Guardsmen will be best acquainted. It can carry a full squad and one passenger (most often an officer, commissar or priest) plus its own crew. In fast moving battles, the Chimera can transport its infantry squad for many miles and this mobility is essential to the fast moving warfare that typifies an Imperial Guard attack, but is less useful in urban fighting and static defence.

[...]


Clearly there is, in that source at least, a distinction made by a fast attack possibility and one where all fights are reduced to a crawl, either in an urban environment or anything even more static, like some glorified line/trench warfare.

They do have motorized formations which are -- theoretically, at last -- capable of rapid advance. Such units are not commonplace, though.

On the topic of the specific quote, the Munitorum Manual says nothing of the sort on page 7. The Chimera isn't even mentioned on it. Either you or Deadguy has misattributed the quote. (No idea where it comes from; as a rule, the MM doesn't speak much about vehicles, period.)

Plus this excerpt, notably the last line:

Image

And other bits. There's the idea that the IG engages large amounts of power, concentrated if possible, and lets the reserve finish the job while the spearhead are here to weaken and divide the enemy force and preventing organization.

To an extent, but we should note that the snippet speaks of individual companies of armored/mechanized troops only. The same book Deadguy is quoting (the Armored Company army list fluff in Chapter Approved) also specifically says that usual doctrine is to split the armored regiments up into their company components and dole them out to support individual infantry regiments.

That's textbook interwar-level doctrine. Concentration of force is very tactical at best. German (or mid-to-late Soviet) doctrine was concentration on a far higher level (division, certainly, and ideally corps or army-level).

When the enemy engages his own mobile forces (which include missile launching platforms apparently), the IG's doctrine still gives it the initiative to force the enemy to a battle of attrition, where all units will be destroyed, instead of merely hitting the "nervous center".

Let's notice that this is grimdark 40K though. Unless the IG engages dissenting human forces, their most numerous enemies are hardly known to surrender. Orks, Tyranids, Chaos, they all seem to go for attrition.
There's a subtlety with the Orks though, as depending on the source, killing the Boss will lead to infighting or immediate replacement by a new badass Ork. Eldars also are dedicate and at best what the IG can get is the enemy fleeing, which is another solution to a battle.

They may not surrender, but any but the most fantasy-themed and unrealistic armies (say, maybe demons made of pure magic) will have their ability to effectively fight back critically impaired once you have destroyed staff, commo and supply functions. Even for Tyranids this is very much the case; hit their "node-beasts" (which are effectively commo links for the guiding hive mind) and they end up a disorganized mess you can wipe out piecemeal.

If you can destroy the enemy's command and control, destroying his actual weapons and troops simply gets far easier afterward, even if you're dealing with fanatically No-Surrender enemies. You get all the multiplier bonuses for superior initiative and ability to achieve surprise and force concentration squared if you can apply them to single battalions instead of a whole regiment, single divisions instead of a whole army, etc. That'll be true for 40k armies as well -- some of them may have a lot of technobabble, but very few are so magical that they can outright ignore these issues.

To return to my faiblesse for historical reminiscences, in WWII, for all that millions of Russians surrendered when they were surrounded by the Germans, many more didn't, at least not until they ran out of fuel and ammo. In fact, this was something that both surprised the Germans and made them angry; the Russians fought too "fanatically" and didn't surrender "fairly" like the British/French did once you had cut them off, but kept up fighting in their "pockets" for as long as they could. Yet (obviously) this didn't invalidate their maneuver war, even if it did make it somewhat less effective.

All things told, and generally speaking, using maneuver to force a war of attrition is about the dumbest thing you can do in all but contrived scenarios.

Besides, WWII is hard to analyze. The evolution within the war had been truly massive. A point I'll return to below.

Certainly true, and then some. Even with the Germans (who started out ahead of everyone else and kept the lead), a 1944 vintage Panzer-Division was nothing like a 1939-model one.

Tanks require much more resources at every point of their existence, and as many men to work endlessly on their birthing and maintenance.
Reinforced or plain concrete, padding, some sheets of iron if needed at some point and holes dug in the dirt cost little to nothing once there. They're also less complex to build and require less intricate resources.

Tanks and mechanized formations have much greater running costs, of course, but heavy fortifications of the Maginot Line or Westwall type required substantial initial investment in order to pay off. For the latter, the Nazis sank over a million tons of steel into that construction alone. They budgeted twice as much money for it as for their armored forces in the years 1937 to -41. (Almost 9 % of the total armaments budget.) That's a very non-trivial opportunity cost, and one which will have affected their field effectiveness in the war, certainly. Imagine how much more that goes for the French, who spent more on their fortifications and had less funds to spare to start with.

Then, we get back to the point of evoluion. People say that money should have been saved to build tanks and planes. They just forget that when the line was started and finished (~28 to 35), the vehicles built then would have been more of the same level of shit that didn't suffice. No radio, no real armour, no heavy cannons, and all the other deficiencies of that time. In other words, massive amounts of wasted money and metal.
The real "gems", the B1s, were too slow to come. Although that alongside the Brits' Matilda II, they were true beasts. I mean, 60 mm or armour on the front, nearly as much on the sides (and they even had a planned flank armour of 70 mm O_O'), plus the front cannon which many German tanks lacked. Add the fact that in general the main hulls were predominantly cast instead and lightly riveted, that made them even tougher than their German counterparts, which went for rivets galore.
But there just weren't enough of 'em and that had a huge cost as well.

IIRC it was the appropriated Czech tanks the Germans used which were riveted constructions. (The so-called Panzer 35(t) and 38(t).) Not so much their native designs.

I also thought construction on the Maginot Line went on well into the late 1930s, with fine-tuning into the war? Admittedly, I'm far from an expert on the 1940 Western campaign though; I tend to focus on the Eastern Front where WWII is concerned.

What I've read agrees, though, that purely technically the Char B1 was a superior design; the Germans considered it a terror, being more or less immune to their common tank and anti-tank guns. (Except for weak spots.) Though it had weaknesses of its own, foremost the one-man turret design.

It's probably best to return to the doctrinal question of the Imperial Guard once we have a complete view of the
They clearly opt for a more versatile and robust doctrine of numbers and massed numbers than trying to move and snipe, although they could do it if they had the appropriate sensor tech and network infrastructure.
Notice that all their infantry can be carried by very mobile transports. These transports also carry very potent weapons. All these vehicles have at the very least radios, which is nothing inferior to the tech used in current "modern warfare".

Even two-way radio is far less than what modern armored warfare makes use of (though it was cutting-edge in WWII). Consider the US Army's Gulf War-era IVIS system or later FBCB2, for example. When it comes to commo and situational awareness there's just no comparison between the "early modern" WWII armored units and those employed on the modern networked battlefield. An excellently trained, veteran Panther Tank commander in 1944 is effectively blind, deaf and mute as compared to an Abrams tanker in 2003.

In the Guard, these kinds of situational awareness aids are either nonexistent (most commonly), or they're tied up with rare supertanks and nonstandard types and modifications. (IIRC a well-supplied Lord General had something going vaguely in this direction in one book, and his special-made headquarters was a high-tech Baneblade that needed its own separate tech-priest to run.) Whereas in modern warfare the US at least gives this to every single MBT.

It seems to me that what sticks in the subconscious of 40K is a redux of the Red Army at Stalingrad, with future tech.
But there seems to be little incentive to consider the possibility that these typical, eponimous battle scenarios are not necessarily the norm, and even perhaps cherry picked cases which fit the most with the desperate mood of 40K.

Let's also consider something interesting. In Ralson's thread, there came a post of his where he was citing IXJac from another thread pitting the US forces against the IG.
IXJac made his point and proved that the US forces used a vast complex of networks to win their battles (which they don't always win: see Afghanistan, despite the really archaïc forces of the enemy).
But one of his opponent was right in proving that a large part of this superioty was only possible because of said networks, exposed stations and a vast collection of satellites. Which means total orbital superiority, because the enemy can't shoot down satellites, nor can penetrate the US' aerial zone and take down the radar arrays.
But what goes if the IG obtains orbital superiority? Not only their ships can see everything and send back all information, but they obviously bust all satellites and all radar stations on the ground. Suddenly, the super advanced but massively fragile US army is blind and mute.

To me, the IG doctrine is robust because it will work very well on worlds where neither forces can have total orbital superiority.
It turns out that the context is extremely important.

If you have a competent orbital force with the kind of precision that requires supporting your ground forces, any enemy ground forces of any note are defeated if they have any kind of parity whatever. There's just no solution to such an overwhelming information and mobility disadvantage. Orbital and aerial supremacy, if used intelligently, will mean the destruction of the enemy as a fighting force whether he depends on satellites or not. The best that can be done in such a situation is to resort to asymmetric warfare against the occupation forces. (Similar to Afghanistan, which was given for comparison.) Field formations will be simply wiped out without ever being able to strike back.

Still, modern forces and doctrine will do better even in such a scenario than would a Guard or WWII one. Their inherent greater flexibility and better training, as well as intrinsic sensors and commo resources (not all of which require satellite or air relays by any means) will be of incomparable assistance. But in the end any force in such a position has simply lost before the actual battle began.

However, Imperium (and Chaos, for that matter) doctrine tends to make very little of either air or space superiority, even when they do have it. In all the books I've read, it's never the kind of decisive advantage it should be. Either they're grossly ineffective at actually exploiting their capabilities, or their air/space assets have severely limited sensors and commo. (Probably a bit of both, given how things are.) In either case, their mode of warfare is such that such concerns are of secondary importance.

There is something that really needs to be pointed out. Contrary to the Soviets at Stalingrad or both Allies and Axis forces around 39~41, the vast ajority of IG mechanized units are reliable and have a high endurance outside of combat (or even in combat). All soldiers can be assured of being given the bare equipment that's still plain enough to shoot nasty things down. In comparison, the percentages of soldiers who had been badly or underequipped on all sides was staggering during the beginning of WWII. The Imperium's industry is quite robbust there. For a reason, of course: there's no notable tech evoluion and it holds many many industrial worlds churning out the weapons, vehicles and equipment day after day.

Point on mechanical reliability. That's actually one of the real strong points the Guard has going for them, which makes them technologically superior to WWII forces at least in that regard. It's quite rarely we see a Leman Russ suffer engine breakdown for example. (For all that they're atrociously designed in just about every other way that counts.)

The real Imperium's ground warfare shouldn't be measured to the IG only. The paradigm needs to encompass more. It is not just how the IG operates, but the idea of that a real proper use of Imperium ground forces should always be a mixture of Space Marines supported by the Imperial Guard. The Space Marines would occupy something like the spearhead role and help give the IG a boost in mobility and penetration, as to mirror for example the spread of resources and technology in the German forces: instead of spreading motorization everywhere everytime, which their industry couldn't hold, they chose to focus their industry on fewer units, while giving them the best stuff, and thus putting a large number of divisions on foot or on horses (iirc there were nearly twice more horses used by the Germans in early WWII than during WWI, and with infantry + horses that should be above 80%, perhaps nearing 90%).
It is this impressive difference of power and mobility which should, somehow, serve as the model here. The high quality being a mix of Space Marines and Terminators plus some Chimeras and other Land Raiders, and eventually a small supplement of high quality IG vehicles, while the rest, the meat, the vast bulk of IG forces, gets the basic stuff.

That might be true for single especially highly prioritized battles and campaigns. But in this context we must note that Space Marines are very rare in the grand scheme of things. With a somewhat conservative number of 1 trillion Guard personnel under arms, they outnumber the million-something Space Marines in service by literally a million to one.

In relative terms, a Space Marine is about as common compared to Guardsmen as the Amerika Bomber compared to German Army soldiers. They're rare "superweapon"-style units you save for the very worst possible situations. The Guard will be fighting 99.99+ per cent of their battles without ever seeing one, much less a tactically useful formation of them. They'll be very incidental to their overall doctrine.

[Mr. Oragahn]

Forgive me for jumping in and out of the discussion, and for heavy snipping. I just can't deal with the entirety of the huge posts you two generate ... :D

*Burp*

They do have motorized formations which are -- theoretically, at last -- capable of rapid advance. Such units are not commonplace, though.

Wouldn't be surprising if the IG is partly an emulation of early WWII. The vast bulk of forces on the west used a large majority of infantry and many were supported by tanks. Around 40, Germans organized their divisions in a better way as to have their best equipped, most motorized and most experimented troops run the attack, with the vast remnants not so kindly supported by logistics.
However, as said above, the common denominator for the IG still sits above what the Germans or Allies had. In light of that, having entire divisions using horses isn't even surprising. It grants great mobility and lasrifles and other weapons which can be transported by infantry or carted by more animals are still more than capable of being a threat. That said, the use of horses or even bicycles by the IG is clearly a rarity if not a simple figment of the imagination.
For the horses, there are the rough riders. But for the bicycles?
We find out that the divisions not benefiting from the use of tanks or trucks still used large amounts of horses or man-powered vehicles such as bicycles on the German side, which makes the so-called non mechanized squads much more mobile than those of the IG which seem to either have to use tanks and trucks or mere feet.

On the topic of the specific quote, the Munitorum Manual says nothing of the sort on page 7. The Chimera isn't even mentioned on it. Either you or Deadguy has misattributed the quote. (No idea where it comes from; as a rule, the MM doesn't speak much about vehicles, period.)

I'll point out that I'm solely working from Deadguy's quotations. I haven't checked 'em out, nor even tried to read the books they come from, which is what I usually do.

I won't be able to read entire novels, but I'll certainly obtain more free time to go through some of the guides and spot sections.

To an extent, but we should note that the snippet speaks of individual companies of armored/mechanized troops only. The same book Deadguy is quoting (the Armored Company army list fluff in Chapter Approved) also specifically says that usual doctrine is to split the armored regiments up into their company components and dole them out to support individual infantry regiments.

That's textbook interwar-level doctrine. Concentration of force is very tactical at best. German (or mid-to-late Soviet) doctrine was concentration on a far higher level (division, certainly, and ideally corps or army-level).

The late-WWII Soviet movements were wonderful monuments to military orchestration, although they had quite the quantity there.
But it doesn't make everything. The reality being that limited SS infantry regiments in Berlin had been able to destroy legions upon legions of tanks during the city's fall.

The question about the IG's doctrine is to know how adaptable it is, if it is context based (parameters of the war theater) and eventually, know if it is possible to separate all procedures into percentages to see which tactics and strategies prevail.

They may not surrender, but any but the most fantasy-themed and unrealistic armies (say, maybe demons made of pure magic) will have their ability to effectively fight back critically impaired once you have destroyed staff, commo and supply functions. Even for Tyranids this is very much the case; hit their "node-beasts" (which are effectively commo links for the guiding hive mind) and they end up a disorganized mess you can wipe out piecemeal.

If you can destroy the enemy's command and control, destroying his actual weapons and troops simply gets far easier afterward, even if you're dealing with fanatically No-Surrender enemies. You get all the multiplier bonuses for superior initiative and ability to achieve surprise and force concentration squared if you can apply them to single battalions instead of a whole regiment, single divisions instead of a whole army, etc. That'll be true for 40k armies as well -- some of them may have a lot of technobabble, but very few are so magical that they can outright ignore these issues.

The question being, how the IG can reach those weaknesses?

Is it unheard of that if the IG truly identifies the weakness, it can gather its most agile, qualified and powerful units to mount a strike force that will soften the enemy considerably?

I would ask something else. How do they get the information about that weakness and keep a tab on it?
The enemy's HQ or high profile commander could be deep behind the front lines, bunkered, or stationing inside some heavily armoured APC or some mobile station.
Without the satellites, without the beacons and mobile drones, all of them which should logically not be able to approach the enemy and survive, the IG is stuck to using good old radar and in situ recon.
Recon units, associated to Sentinel squadrons, are clearly identified as being part of the spearheading armoured companies in the IMG quote. It is also said that Cadia is used as a model (although the situation of Cadia is that of an impossibly static quagmire), and Cadians produce reconnaissance regiments.
And that, of course, is dependent on a clear sensor sight. Any jamming will just put a severe halt to any mobility. No point rushing or even trying to when you're half blind because of a sort of fog of war.

To return to my faiblesse for historical reminiscences, in WWII, for all that millions of Russians surrendered when they were surrounded by the Germans, many more didn't, at least not until they ran out of fuel and ammo. In fact, this was something that both surprised the Germans and made them angry; the Russians fought too "fanatically" and didn't surrender "fairly" like the British/French did once you had cut them off, but kept up fighting in their "pockets" for as long as they could. Yet (obviously) this didn't invalidate their maneuver war, even if it did make it somewhat less effective.

All things told, and generally speaking, using maneuver to force a war of attrition is about the dumbest thing you can do in all but contrived scenarios.

Not necessarily if it lets you considerably soften the enemy and accelerate his attrition rate.
Imagine that things are a bit static, but that for a moment, by being smart, you may draw a division out of its bunkered positions, or even run around them and hit at an angle they had not considered. And let's say that this division protected some route, sensor station or even say an industrial asset, like perhaps some fuel refinery and deposit. There's clearly a point in trying to take that down if it can't be captured.

In Afghanistan, aren't the US-NATO forces essentially trying to completely eradicate the Talibans, fighting against what is nothing more than infantry and eventually using technicals as the epitome of their motorization?
The networks make the armies more responsive and lets them use less resources to destroy targets, there's less waste. But in the end, considering the cellular nature of those Taliban squads using anything from rifles to stingers and mortar, there isn't much that can be done other than destroy them all. And yet, the use of indiscriminate firepower isn't allowed, just like the IG couldn't rely on orbital firepower to level a distant city in one fell swoop.

Besides, WWII is hard to analyze. The evolution within the war had been truly massive. A point I'll return to below.

Certainly true, and then some. Even with the Germans (who started out ahead of everyone else and kept the lead), a 1944 vintage Panzer-Division was nothing like a 1939-model one.

The Germans were ahead of other in the way they thought. On the side of material (ground and air vehicles, artillery) and even combat experience, they were behind against the Allies, save for the better organized crew members and the ubiquitous use of radio. They better organized the little resources they had, concentrating armour and engines while their military stock lagged behind. For example, right after Poland, they realized that they were losing more trucks due to sheer maintenance than what the factories could produce. So they said fuck that, we'll stop stretching our resources and focus our forces to make elite divisions and even make them superior in comms, mobility and task completion: in tanks, one crew member dedicated to one specific role made each tank more efficient for each one of its duties, even if armoured divs largely relied on the first two Panzer models, essentially near complete suckfests on treads. :D
The Allies were trying to build a football team without any real cohesion and with each player having to master each single aptitude that you could need on a football terrain, regardless of the player's position.

Tanks require much more resources at every point of their existence, and as many men to work endlessly on their birthing and maintenance.
Reinforced or plain concrete, padding, some sheets of iron if needed at some point and holes dug in the dirt cost little to nothing once there. They're also less complex to build and require less intricate resources.

Tanks and mechanized formations have much greater running costs, of course, but heavy fortifications of the Maginot Line or Westwall type required substantial initial investment in order to pay off. For the latter, the Nazis sank over a million tons of steel into that construction alone. They budgeted twice as much money for it as for their armored forces in the years 1937 to -41. (Almost 9 % of the total armaments budget.) That's a very non-trivial opportunity cost, and one which will have affected their field effectiveness in the war, certainly. Imagine how much more that goes for the French, who spent more on their fortifications and had less funds to spare to start with.

Aside from the possibility that it is entirely doubtful that they'd have voluntarily spent so much money directly on legions of tanks, what would have happened is that they would have just built much more of the models that would be outdated by 39. And all those MOAR tanx and playnz would have also required fuck tons more of maintenance crews, logistics behind them, metal and fuel, which no side could obtain.
However, holes, sands, and reinforced concrete plus small guns, that's really nothing in comparison, no matter the little extras infrastructures you could find inside the Maginot Line's fortresses.
I don't care if Patton thought that fixed defenses were a testament to human stupidity, because he simply didn't think the whole thing through.
We may take a look at how much it takes to build what essentially amounts to a thick house with some guns pointing out of it and trolleys to carry the ammo, and building one single tank. We have to consider that the industries were hardly that nationalized, on either sides.
Eventually, the only thing that would have been better with all that money would have been to put more funds into R&D right of the bat and make the vehicles modular enough so that they could be easily upgraded and even refurbished to trade armoured for speed and firepower. Of course, there's nothing telling us that more money would have significantly hastened the discovery of new technologies, no matter their magnitude, even if for only small pieces in giant machineries.

It's probably best to return to the doctrinal question of the Imperial Guard once we have a complete view of the
They clearly opt for a more versatile and robust doctrine of numbers and massed numbers than trying to move and snipe, although they could do it if they had the appropriate sensor tech and network infrastructure.
Notice that all their infantry can be carried by very mobile transports. These transports also carry very potent weapons. All these vehicles have at the very least radios, which is nothing inferior to the tech used in current "modern warfare".

Even two-way radio is far less than what modern armored warfare makes use of (though it was cutting-edge in WWII). Consider the US Army's Gulf War-era IVIS system or later FBCB2, for example. When it comes to commo and situational awareness there's just no comparison between the "early modern" WWII armored units and those employed on the modern networked battlefield. An excellently trained, veteran Panther Tank commander in 1944 is effectively blind, deaf and mute as compared to an Abrams tanker in 2003.

In the Guard, these kinds of situational awareness aids are either nonexistent (most commonly), or they're tied up with rare supertanks and nonstandard types and modifications. (IIRC a well-supplied Lord General had something going vaguely in this direction in one book, and his special-made headquarters was a high-tech Baneblade that needed its own separate tech-priest to run.) Whereas in modern warfare the US at least gives this to every single MBT.

Radio waves need not to be limited to the transport of audio data. But they're still radio nonetheless.
Not to say that the vast majority of troops and crew members don't need anything else besides pure vocal orders and info, certainly not fancy drawings on integrated iPads.
Yet the IG could provide all of that and even more, with real time 3D holograms.

So the only limitation has to be found in the design of the machines then. If it takes a customized Baneblade to act as a mobile station, and if this is a rare occurrence, then it seems unavoidable to conclude that the IG is indeed limited.
It all boils down to that question I asked about the gathering, treatment, distribution and reception of data.
We really need much more information on those points.
Imperial Armour may possess such data in details, although there's probably some guide that could give us a number of general ideas as to what the IG relies on.

It seems to me that what sticks in the subconscious of 40K is a redux of the Red Army at Stalingrad, with future tech.
But there seems to be little incentive to consider the possibility that these typical, eponymous battle scenarios are not necessarily the norm, and even perhaps cherry picked cases which fit the most with the desperate mood of 40K.

Let's also consider something interesting. In Ralson's thread, there came a post of his where he was citing IXJac from another thread pitting the US forces against the IG.
IXJac made his point and proved that the US forces used a vast complex of networks to win their battles (which they don't always win: see Afghanistan, despite the really archaïc forces of the enemy).
But one of his opponent was right in proving that a large part of this superiority was only possible because of said networks, exposed stations and a vast collection of satellites. Which means total orbital superiority, because the enemy can't shoot down satellites, nor can penetrate the US' aerial zone and take down the radar arrays.
But what goes if the IG obtains orbital superiority? Not only their ships can see everything and send back all information, but they obviously bust all satellites and all radar stations on the ground. Suddenly, the super advanced but massively fragile US army is blind and mute.

To me, the IG doctrine is robust because it will work very well on worlds where neither forces can have total orbital superiority.
It turns out that the context is extremely important.

If you have a competent orbital force with the kind of precision that requires supporting your ground forces, any enemy ground forces of any note are defeated if they have any kind of parity whatever. There's just no solution to such an overwhelming information and mobility disadvantage. Orbital and aerial supremacy, if used intelligently, will mean the destruction of the enemy as a fighting force whether he depends on satellites or not. The best that can be done in such a situation is to resort to asymmetric warfare against the occupation forces. (Similar to Afghanistan, which was given for comparison.) Field formations will be simply wiped out without ever being able to strike back.

There's a case when this is not the case: when one or several ships of army A can deploy troops and destroys ground ot space missiles and other satellites, but can't approach a certain sector of a planet's orbit because of defenses on the ground which cover that particular region of space. That, and eventually the presence of shields.

Which means that I can't really see how all those scenarios with the IG stuck into wars of attrition can be fairly compared to modern warfare, when it is clear that the IG in such cases doesn't have any superiority in space or perhaps in the air, and that the scenarios have essentially devolved into unbelievable situations where both sides will stripe mine the planet to its core before one side surrenders (not being literal here, btw).

Still, modern forces and doctrine will do better even in such a scenario than would a Guard or WWII one. Their inherent greater flexibility and better training, as well as intrinsic sensors and commo resources (not all of which require satellite or air relays by any means) will be of incomparable assistance. But in the end any force in such a position has simply lost before the actual battle began.

WWII, surely, since they didn't have any tech to use orbital altitudes as an advantage, and air was hardly that impressive either (lumbering bombers, bad aiming, limited range and ammo capacity, etc).
However, when it comes to the Guard, this is where we'll clearly be in disagreement, at least in theory.
With the IG having orbital and air superiority, with air crafts capable of reaching very high, there's literally nothing any large NATO force could do that would be comparable in terms of overkill domination.
But...

However, Imperium (and Chaos, for that matter) doctrine tends to make very little of either air or space superiority, even when they do have it. In all the books I've read, it's never the kind of decisive advantage it should be. Either they're grossly ineffective at actually exploiting their capabilities, or their air/space assets have severely limited sensors and commo. (Probably a bit of both, given how things are.) In either case, their mode of warfare is such that such concerns are of secondary importance.

That is totally odd. Unless of course the cases you think of are those where the Guard is already stuck in a situation where it doesn't really possess any real air superiority or logistic margin.
Or that their systems are bad and their doctrine limited. Added to what I said about their vehicles a few posts ago, I'll add those elements:

- Orbital shots aren't very precise.
- Aircrafts aren't particularly aerodynamic (euphemism, they're like flying bricks).
- Starships mainly use dumb torpedoes, as any kind of guided torpedo is a rarity. Same could happen on the ground. I'm yet to see anything about guided mortar for example.

For the moment, we're only confirming the use of ideas which were updated from WWI and idea straight for early WWII, possibly late WWII in some cases. All of this then with complete outliers, such as space ships, advanced weapon tech, but a lackluster use of networked comms and crews entirely dedicated to the management of data.

The real Imperium's ground warfare shouldn't be measured to the IG only. The paradigm needs to encompass more. It is not just how the IG operates, but the idea of that a real proper use of Imperium ground forces should always be a mixture of Space Marines supported by the Imperial Guard. The Space Marines would occupy something like the spearhead role and help give the IG a boost in mobility and penetration, as to mirror for example the spread of resources and technology in the German forces: instead of spreading motorization everywhere everytime, which their industry couldn't hold, they chose to focus their industry on fewer units, while giving them the best stuff, and thus putting a large number of divisions on foot or on horses (iirc there were nearly twice more horses used by the Germans in early WWII than during WWI, and with infantry + horses that should be above 80%, perhaps nearing 90%).
It is this impressive difference of power and mobility which should, somehow, serve as the model here. The high quality being a mix of Space Marines and Terminators plus some Chimeras and other Land Raiders, and eventually a small supplement of high quality IG vehicles, while the rest, the meat, the vast bulk of IG forces, gets the basic stuff.

That might be true for single especially highly prioritized battles and campaigns. But in this context we must note that Space Marines are very rare in the grand scheme of things. With a somewhat conservative number of 1 trillion Guard personnel under arms, they outnumber the million-something Space Marines in service by literally a million to one.

In relative terms, a Space Marine is about as common compared to Guardsmen as the Amerika Bomber compared to German Army soldiers. They're rare "superweapon"-style units you save for the very worst possible situations. The Guard will be fighting 99.99+ per cent of their battles without ever seeing one, much less a tactically useful formation of them. They'll be very incidental to their overall doctrine.

I decided to open the Imperial Monitorum book. I'm just beginning to go through it.
However, right there on page 13, lies a schematic view of the regimental organization of Cadians (which might explain many things if Cadians are taken as a template by many regiments across the galaxy, regardless of their own needs).
To note: Space Marines, the inquisition and assassins and put aside in a category that's "non-regimental support".
Oddly enough, it also seems that company captains and commissars of two different companies can share control of tanks and artillery. Tanks and artillery are strictly identified as support. It says: "Tank & Artillery Support".

It confirms what I already knew of the IG, being that they have simple training at first and many regiments see their men getting hours of extra training as they travel aboard ships towards forge worlds in order to supplement their regiments with more vehicles, weapons and stuff. We're far from the weeks of training in the US army. The experience does the rest, as it did for the German soldiers during the run on Poland.

Other important point. It says, on page 15, about the colonel rank, that "in most warzones, there is no need to employ ranks above this level."
Quite interesting regarding the scale of wars. It also adds: "In any active warzone, there are hundreds of senior commanders with thousands of personal staff."

That book is an universe product, a form of propaganda. Commissars are portrayed as rigorous warriors and necessary, and bring only positive values, but page notes cite two examples, of Yarrick and Eyurban. While it appears that the former never drew his gun to punish troopers, the later killed more men of his regiment than the enemy during the assault on Hyrus Hive.

Communications seem to be really a problem for some regiments. Endnote on page 18 speaks of a regiment being given orders six weeks after being wiped out, this destruction not being noted by the administration, the Departmento Munitorum.

Page 19: Six power packs are enough to fire a minimum of 2000 shots. That means when the gun is set on maximum firepower (the maximum of shots accessible when used conservatively).
That's a little over 333 shots per power pack on the highest setting.
There's that infamous line about the megathule range: "Most lasguns operate in the nineteen-megathule range."
A proof that odd units should not be discounted (remember tetrajoules for spaceships?).

We can also read, a few lines below, this bit: "During the 91st's recent combat activity on Cadia, the regiment consumed 400,000 lasgun power packs, 120,000 ration packs, over 3 million gallons of fuel, 13.500 pints of Type O Negative and fired enough ordnance to level a continent (estimated)."

Comparing this to statistics from WWII would be interesting, if only to get an idea of the rate of consumption of resources regarding activity and duration of said activity. For example, the 3M gallons of fuel are a very interesting benchmark which I suppose we could directly compare to WWII campaigns. The amount of firepower deployed per unit of fuel consumed should be interesting as well. It's good to notice that the 91st infantry numbers aren't large: 5037. However, this doesn't count the armoured units (which just confirms that they supplement the infantry).

Ok, this is not the topic... so I'm still looking for info on live data management.
There's a mention of vox-casters but it doesn't go beyond that.

Now I'm skipping stuff because I want to find some info about communications, how they can request supplies and deploy them, how terrain data and global intelligence are gathered and diced for proper use by the platoons.

Page 25 may reveal that lasguns aren't totally immune to mechanical issues. One reveals a case of ash clogging in the arming chamber, bending the barrel as the trooper tried to clean it. But the DM officer doubts the claim, but still sends another lasgun. It's most likely that DMOs are making sure that the good material of the Imperium never gets derided, so it's better to scoff at the idea of a lasgun breaking.

The rules about the use, misuse or uncalled request of the DM's equipment and other rules of combat around the pages 40s are humourous; at some point the punishment even reduces the efficiency of the regiments. It literally gives the commissars rights to threaten any soldier indiscriminately and put a huge pressure on them.

Elite units also have micro-vox beads, the "microphone" stuck to the larynx while the "earplugs" are stuck on the facial bone. That's quite some interesting comm tech for stealth squads. It's rare equipment.
The description of the standard helmet makes no mention of any communication device.

Later there's a mention of personal vox, but then again it's given to specialised units and seems to be short ranged: 200m. It also weighs three damned kilograms, plus the additional one kilo due to the power pack! O_O
That shit lasts between ten and twenty hours!!!
WTF?

Now, on the other hand, the auspex surveyor looks to be some top notch tech.
At the squad level, it gives a level of independence that is immense, as any squad having one of those things can quickly scan an area in front of the device and spot friendlies from foes (lifeforms seem to be the only thing analyzed though). It scans for "varying level of background radiation, infrared signatures and electromagnetic emissions." However, they're "commonly issued to specialised infiltrating troops, sentries and fixed defence points in forward base positions."
IG troopers are supposed to have id-tags.
That stuff is way beyond WWII, at the squad level.

Doctrine wise, the book mentioned that dugging trenches was one of the expected activities. As their normal equipment, all soldiers are given one shovel.
Now we're back at WWI. Somme and Verdun ahoy!

The part that speaks about personal protection mentions that high ranking officers can literally have access to force fields: refractor fields deflect the energy of incoming shots, while conversion field convert the energy into another one (light for example).
If this can be deployed, while don't they use anything bigger to cast a dome over entire groups?
A Chimera should surely be able to carry such a device and respectively be able to provided a protection sufficient to deflect countless megajoules of enemy fire. Surely enough to negate the advantage of a networked enemy who counted on the initiative to shoot down enemies before they could approach.


On page 61 it says that when "used conservatively, a laser power pack will last for many shots (typically around a hundred and fifty)."
150 shots x 6 power packs = 900 shots. And that on the lowest settings!
Huh. CONTRADICTION!
I suppose that you're not expected to look too much into such numbers. The 2000 shots figure would make much more sense if it were 200 instead...

The lowest setting can be safely assumed to be equivalent to the firepower of a rifle bullet.
If we take the 5.56×45mm NATO round and an average of 1.8 KJ, we get 270 KJ per power pack. On page 60, after all, it is said that the lasgun "fires an explosive energy blast with a similar effect to a bullet or a small shell."
The use of shotguns with no particular future tech tricks that amplify the firepower makes me think we have little reason to consider that the average bullet firepower equivalent that we should use should be that of a sniper round. Hence the use of a basic NATO round, instead.

That's more than twice less what I got earlier on. :/
We also learn that laspistols clips fit in the grip, for 80 shots per clip (there are very little fire settings on such weapons). The fire is of a shorter range.
I'll probably return to the weapons page later. It really gives a rather conservative view of the firepower of anything mentioned there, even boltguns (they're said to make gory entry and exit points in targets, clearly refuting the idea of bodies being literally torn to confetti and blood clouds).
I'm also dubious about the 200 maximum effective range of the mortars. No wonder why with such a range, their operators can be flanked!

There is a small description of what is a basic chain of transmission of data, precisely regarding the acquisition of a target by mortar firers.
Nothing incredible, although there's the mention of adjustment (of azimuth), visual or remote-servitor.
Well...

Possibly the most interesting bit comes at page 87, with artillery orders including "vox fire direction".
Basically, it seems someone has to yell the right coordinates?

There's more stuff to read but I'm tired. ;)

[Mr. Oragahn]

Worth the read:
http://www.essentialsomme.com

USMC Vs. Imperial Guard (40k) (2004)

[Mr. Oragahn]

Thinking of the auspex surveyor...
I guess those guys would have loved that toy.

[sonofccn]

Clearly there is, in that source at least, a distinction made by a fast attack possibility

Well there are elements which can be tactically fast as referenced by the Imperial Guard codex circa 2008:

"These {Armored Fist squads} lend speed and tactical flexibility to the often slow and rigid formations of the Guard" page 39
Through it is more open to debate if they use them as part of a fast attack strategy rather than merely mechanized dragoons. The Codex on the same page talks of them “ …forge ahead of the main advance and seize vital objectives until ground pounding reinforcements arrive.” No mention of tanks or being part of a spearhead per say and taking and holding an objective strikes me as counter-intuitive for what maneuver warfare is, keeping your enemy off balance/ pressing the attack/trying to get behind his line.

and one where all fights are reduced to a crawl, either in an urban environment or anything even more static, like some glorified line/trench warfare

It merely says the Chimera is less useful. To me that speaks of doctrine issues, since static defenses are not easily bypassed, rather than support that the German army would be forced to fight WWI style against a defensive line.

And other bits.

?

There's the idea that the IG engages large amounts of power, concentrated if possible, and lets the reserve finish the job while the spearhead are here to weaken and divide the enemy force and preventing organization.
When the enemy engages his own mobile forces (which include missile launching platforms apparently), the IG's doctrine still gives it the initiative to force the enemy to a battle of attrition, where all units will be destroyed, instead of merely hitting the "nervous center".

Except the spearhead appears to cause the concentration not prevent it. Similarly it is this concentration which gives the slow, ponderous Guard its initiative. Namely it draws the enemy into easy reach.

Further how to square you conclusion with Deadguys:

Imperial Guard Codex 2nd edition lays out the origins of the Guard as a fast, hard hitting army.


The necessity of fluid and flexible warfare on the battlefields of the 41st millennium.

There's not much difference in large unit strategy between Soviet Deep Battle and modern doctrines.

I'd rather hear from you what you makes you think there's no such rough parity between "blitz" runs or crawlish battles. I think it's pretty clear that there is such a thing.

There is no parity between mobile combat and "crawlish" battles. "Blitz" is a particular type of fighting strategy, a war of maneuver, where you evade your enemy's hard points and get into his soft rear. Attrition warfare in the sense I'm trying to whittle down my opponent/exhaust him is not in and of itself outdated nor have I argued such merely that static or slow tempo attrition ala WWI is out dated.

The winter line was nothing fancy. The Pomerania Wall had strong points but the Axis forces here were just not enough.

You offered them as examples.

Tanks require much more resources at every point of their existence, and as many men to work endlessly on their birthing and maintenance.

Considering, per General Donner, the Germans sank more money in their “line” than their armored forces I do not see how you can make this argument. All that fortification is expensive.

Reinforced or plain concrete, padding, some sheets of iron if needed at some point and holes dug in the dirt cost little to nothing once there. They're also less complex to build and require less intricate resources.

I’m afraid you still are not comprehending the scale of your work. It isn’t remotely a one to one ratio between tanks and pillboxes. My one tank can cross your border at any point but your one pillbox can only guard its singular segment so you have to build all across your border to stop me. Then multiply that by the force needed to stop an actual, serious push to have an idea of what you’re putting down. Simply put massive fortified lines are resource intensive.

Tanks, on the other hand, were sources of massive hairpulling logistic issues for both sides.

War is logistics plain and simple. But if you wish to calculate that in the "cost" yes a mobile army advancing into the enemy will have a more difficult logistic chain than a static emplacement.

Regarding static defense, it is only recently that bunker busters have become so potent that bunkers are nearly useless unless massively reinforced, deeper and having some structure on the surface to deviate the trajectory of the falling projectile in order to nullify part of its potency due to sheer momentum.

I beg to differ. Taken from here:

"The most spectacular failure of the Belgian fortress system in World War II, and the most spectacular demonstration of the dominance of offense forces, was seen in the 1 day capture Eben Emael, possibly the strongest single fort in the world at the time."

WWII showed static defenses were old hat and ineffective.

In WWII, the most reinforced sections of the greater defensive lines were virtually undefeatable. The Maginot line's best forts were either taken down after a massive concerted effort from the German forces (and at this point the French forces were just not operated, largely leaving the forts alone), or simply never taken down, with the French troops inside asked to surrender once the political authority fell.

Irreverent. The Line was broken through. As built the Maginot line was a failure.

Now there were design flaws in the line, but it still worked wonders for what it was supposed to do. Safe that the stupid large gaps, of course. Either you build a medium line that's going to let you build time by delaying the enemy in order to allow you to organize your forces, or you plan a full static defense, but you do it completely. The French central command's dogma was completely half arsed. There.

Previously you've been talking up the Line like it was some wonder, uber design that totally worked and it was only due to it not being extended that it had a problem. Now your saying the Maginot Line itself was poorly built but the idea behind it would have been valid?

Then, we get back to the point of evoluion. People say that money should have been saved to build tanks and planes. They just forget that when the line was started and finished (~28 to 35), the vehicles built then would have been more of the same level of shit that didn't suffice. No radio, no real armour, no heavy cannons, and all the other deficiencies of that time. In other words, massive amounts of wasted money and metal.

Assuming they hadn't sunk their money in the "Line" they could have invested in their tank development more leading to tank designs more comparable to the Germans, better motorized their infantry, etc. Further the primary failure of France wasn’t material, their tanks were bigger and heavier than the Germans after all, but of doctrine.

The real "gems", the B1s, were too slow to come. Although that alongside the Brits' Matilda II, they were true beasts. I mean, 60 mm or armour on the front, nearly as much on the sides (and they even had a planned flank armour of 70 mm O_O'), plus the front cannon which many German tanks lacked.

They were too heavy, too slow. D2s would likely be your better bet. Still slower than a Panzer III but comparable armor and cannon without the expense of the B1's. Give them a half way decent doctrine and infantry which support them rather than the other way around and you could do some damage.

Outside of any strategical considerations (the bluff of Group C near the line), the point is that the line was largely avoided precisely because the German forces would have broke their teeth on it and that would have been completely detrimental to their strategy, which was absolutely required considering the real "quality" of German tanks back in 40.

That's your speculation. The Germans went around the "Line" because that was the easiest, most efficient route they could find. That doesn't mean they would have "broke their teeth" going through.

What made them superior was the ubiquity of radio through all mechanized units, even the smallest, and the dissociated driving and aiming of the main cannon. But not their firepower or armour.

Yes. I am aware of this. That is the whole point. The Germans were materially weaker than their opponents, that opposed to lacking in preparation or material the Allies held a distinct advantage in most categories and it was only because of the more effective operations by the Germans which allowed them to prevail. Essentially, condensing to very crude points, the Germans utilized speed and concentration of force to dictate the terms of engagements that they fought and evade the rest while moving behind their opponent’s lines faster than they could react.

As you can see in the article, the vast majority of the "forts" to fell were actually small structures, many located along the weakest sections of the line. Many forts were taken by the "simple" action of infantry, even on completely open lands.

Which doesn't alter the fact the German got through. So unless I'm missing something it is quite possible they could force a wedge through the Line and drive through initiating Blitzkrieg.

This position needs refinement. Aside from the idea that quantity is a quality of its own, the German forces were much more "modern warfare" than anything the Allies came with. So only a swarm of armour could hope to compensate the difference of efficiency and action-reaction. There's indeed a point when even fine tech and faster reflexes doesn't undo sheer overnumbering.
Now, I'm basing this on how they used the Allies, especially the French, used their units. Why I say moar tanks is to compensate for the deficiency in their doctrine. One of the main problems of Belgian and French forces was the composition of their divisions. The motorization was rather, err... not really homogeneous. Meaning that when things started to move fast, the lack of "elite" divisions and the generalization of the messy jack of all trades resulted in groups literally stretching. With the problem of communication endemic to the Allies' forces, this was a total disaster.
Meaning that unless we suddenly make all units better, a rather obtuse but mathematically correct way to even the problem would require multiplying the number of already existing units, so at least there would still be more of the best units of each group.
Now, the B1s were quite better and also had the radio.
I mean, it's either more numbers or a near complete revamp of the Allies or at least French and Belgian forces.
I guess you could equally go with the full revamp. All in all, both scenario are completely made up and, as I alluded to in my previous post, fantaisies.

The issue through is a large enough force, a large enough industrial advantage will win. That is not being debated. The question was if two rough parity, equal tech/numbers etc, would see a return to a stalemate. If one side has vastly more resources than the point is null.

At least regarding the French, the problem was that they clearly didn't go with either A or B. They had tons of mothballed forces and a slowly ramping up industry. They had planned on a long war (all relative, several years, not mere months) and knew that under such conditions they'd have no issue getting what they needed as long as they could count on their super duper wall of balls. Trouble is, they believed in some kind of perverted version of the initial concept behind the Maginot line. They had become slaves to their own creation, putting too much faith in its deterrence capacity without keeping an eye on the organization required to meet the new evolution of military doctrine in 40. Instead of going with a defensive organization and an industry potent enough at first to require little to be activated, increased and mobilized, they really put their development to a crawl while not completing the defensive line that would have given them the right to do so. They just did it all wrong, probably because they didn't want to fight. Out of WWI, and now with enough economical wealth they didn't want to risk, they didn't give themselves the tools for victory.

There many ways to get a France victory, at least in theory. But that is again diverging from point. You argued we would have a upgunned version of WWI, mass tanks running between fortified lines, not that France could win the War.

Besides, you wouldn't be building them or equivalents between 1928 and 1935. You'd be outputting more of the stuff that wouldn't win you battles, but only maintain control over... controlled space.

The Heinkels were used during the Battle of France. All I'm doing is building more of the tykes from any "money" left over from mobilizing my infantry.

Are you portraying a fair scenario or not? Because all of this is a presentation of a win-win case.
You attack two distant points in the line; you break them.
Your planes attack; they can bombard the line, its fortresses and even get beyond the line, hitting anything soft and other key points for movement (bridges, etc.).

That's fine, but what is the point?
Why the defense doesn't possess mobile forces combining long range artillery, anti-tank guns and tanks and anti-aircraft pieces?
Why are the fortresses incapable of firing at the planes, and why isn't there anything behind the wall to shoot down the planes?

It’s a battle plan. No more, no less.

You mean the fact that they enter a battle of attrition, when their first armour lines meet equally potent armoured divisions, is a question of doctrine more than anything else?

Like I said it doesn't say armor. It says "Mobile forces".

And do we have any evidence that they don't try to outmaneuver their enemies?

You saw the quotes. The Guard is slow, ponderous. Their strengths are firepower and attrition. There is no evidence to support them outmaneuvering their enemy as a matter of course.

We haven't even proved that the IG can't do modern warfare, with all its advanced systems, when it can claim orbital or air superiority, thus benefiting a hawk's eye view of the battlefield.

I’m slightly confused. Initially it appeared we agreed the Guard fought interwar style and merely disagreed as to the cause. Now you’re arguing the Guard fights modern?

We haven't figure out how data is managed at all.

No we haven't. We may never since it is unlikely we will ever deal with that in any depth. Like I said the best we can do is look to how the Guard fights.

It's probably best to return to the doctrinal question of the Imperial Guard once we have a complete view of the

I think you left a sentence hanging.

They clearly opt for a more versatile and robust doctrine of numbers and massed numbers than trying to move and snipe, although they could do it if they had the appropriate sensor tech and network infrastructure.

Except, all things being equal, its not more versatile or robust. It’s a highly fragile and unwieldly doctrine. It has the virtue of being simplistic and if you have low quality troops but high volume you can argue it makes sense within your own deficient context.

Notice that all their infantry can be carried by very mobile transports. These transports also carry very potent weapons. All these vehicles have at the very least radios, which is nothing inferior to the tech used in current "modern warfare".

No. There is much more to "modern warfare" than just having some radios. For starters it would need to demonstrated that they use those radios similar to how the Germans did to coordinate and focus their attacks.

It seems to me that what sticks in the subconscious of 40K is a redux of the Red Army at Stalingrad, with future tech.
But there seems to be little incentive to consider the possibility that these typical, eponimous battle scenarios are not necessarily the norm, and even perhaps cherry picked cases which fit the most with the desperate mood of 40K.

Well I can only evualuate the evidence I have seen and read. If you have some more evidence I'd be willing to debate it.

But one of his opponent was right in proving that a large part of this superioty was only possible because of said networks, exposed stations and a vast collection of satellites. Which means total orbital superiority, because the enemy can't shoot down satellites, nor can penetrate the US' aerial zone and take down the radar arrays.

The Guard have had orbital superiority. Vraks being a case in point. Further more Germans circa 1940 had no "networks" beyond radios, something the Guard has as well, and they demostrated brilliantly manuver warfare. Simply put toys do not define doctrine but rather vice versa.

Not only their ships can see everything and send back all information, but they obviously bust all satellites and all radar stations on the ground.

The issue through is they rarely if ever do this.

Suddenly, the super advanced but massively fragile US army is blind and mute.

Actually both ground and air mobile radar systems would still be up as should be radio communication. Further US doctrine and training ensure each soldier is far more flexible and capable of “rolling with the punches” than a Guard equivalent.

To me, the IG doctrine is robust because it will work very well on worlds where neither forces can have total orbital superiority.

And I would counter that it wouldn’t work well or at all against any world with Modern doctrine even if all other variables, tech and numbers, were even. That it is too slow tempoed, to rigid and reliant on a top heavy command structure.

It turns out that the context is extremely important.

And I fail to see how the context changes anything.

The guides and quotations really give general ideas, but for the moment I'm yet to read something that goes into details as to how the IG behaves depending on the nature of the target, its defenses, its mobility and networks, and the null, partial or complete control of space or air.

Well if you find anything let me know.

This is where we should be looking at a variety of battle cases. If you want to properly cover your topic, that's what will happen one day or another. How much have you read of the fluff or novels?

Mostly the Cain books and why I feel the Guard could fight 40’s style if they got their druthers up. For instances:
“The last thing I found was a drawer full of com-beads no doubt intended to let survivors of a crash landing explore their surroundings without loosing touch with one another” Page 87 Defender of the Imperium omnibus.
The above in reference to an random escape pod Cain, and Jurgen, had accidently been jettisoned in implying com-beads are fairly common. Further we get this as a footnote by Inquisitor Vail :

“…as combeads are intended for short-range use only, typically between the members of an Imperial Guard squad.” Further reinforcing common usage as well as their inherent limitations. Ironically it mentions combeads work better with the infrastructure found at the regimental level through later in the story Cain was, just, able to communicate across a town to a backpack vox so “infrastructure” may be a loose thing in the Guard.

But I'm sure that equipment for vehicles such as transports, tanks, titans and then large industrial structures with a modicum of automation require admech and their voodoo.

And as far as I know, while they have to be blessed and sanctified by the Admech, “activation runes” are buttons which can be operated by anyone. Going back to the Defender of the Imperium omnibus page 85 we have this:

“With a little ccautious experimentation was enough to prove he could[drive] with almost as much elan as he handled the Salamander I habitually requisitioned…” This in reference to Jurgen Cain’s aid and driver driving Ork buggies they’ve captured. At no point is it suggested a techpriest would be needed to start said vehicles, or the command Salamander Cain usually is driven in, through Cain does make a snarky comment about how they would try and exercise the machines.

There is something that really needs to be pointed out. Contrary to the Soviets at Stalingrad or both Allies and Axis forces around 39~41, the vast ajority of IG mechanized units are reliable and have a high endurance outside of combat (or even in combat). All soldiers can be assured of being given the bare equipment that's still plain enough to shoot nasty things down.

Well Guard tech is more reliable than Earth tech, then or now, but comparatively speaking it isn't any better and at times is worse than the foes they fight.

In comparison, the percentages of soldiers who had been badly or underequipped on all sides was staggering during the beginning of WWII. The Imperium's industry is quite robbust there.

Isn't that more determined by the foes they fight rather than the Imperium. I mean if there is an example of the Imperium encountering an enemy whose tanks could buff Imperium anti-tank weapons and they turn around and whip out an improvement that would be impressive. Something we could make comparisons to Germany during the war for instances, who ran repeatedly into this problem, or the US. As it is I don't see anything really to make a comparison.

The real Imperium's ground warfare shouldn't be measured to the IG only. The paradigm needs to encompass more. It is not just how the IG operates, but the idea of that a real proper use of Imperium ground forces should always be a mixture of Space Marines supported by the Imperial Guard.

Like General Donner said it isn’t the norm for the Guard and Marines to work together. It happens, Taros had both Guard and Marines, but it isn’t typical.

[Mr. Oragahn]

Clearly there is, in that source at least, a distinction made by a fast attack possibility

Well there are elements which can be tactically fast as referenced by the Imperial Guard codex circa 2008:

"These {Armored Fist squads} lend speed and tactical flexibility to the often slow and rigid formations of the Guard" page 39
Through it is more open to debate if they use them as part of a fast attack strategy rather than merely mechanized dragoons. The Codex on the same page talks of them “ …forge ahead of the main advance and seize vital objectives until ground pounding reinforcements arrive.” No mention of tanks or being part of a spearhead per say and taking and holding an objective strikes me as counter-intuitive for what maneuver warfare is, keeping your enemy off balance/ pressing the attack/trying to get behind his line.

It depends on the defenses they meet. Planes aren't the sturdiest systems.
If the objectives are vital, then there is the possible implication that merely going blasting forth won't do them any good until some beachhead can be established. What I mean is that if there's no such intermediary vital target to seize, then it means the IG could indeed push its assault as deep as it could.

and one where all fights are reduced to a crawl, either in an urban environment or anything even more static, like some glorified line/trench warfare

It merely says the Chimera is less useful. To me that speaks of doctrine issues, since static defenses are not easily bypassed, rather than support that the German army would be forced to fight WWI style against a defensive line.

Only if you disregard the other quote, which shows us that unless the IG meets equal armour, it will storm through the enemy's forces.
That Chimeras become less effective isn't surprising. High firepower vehicles aren't meant for street struggles, where the environment naturally limits LOS while leaving a lot of opportunities to infantry to get close to the armour and blast them. Chimeras suited for long range combat couldn't deal efficiently with a close range warfare. They'd need to be refitted to match the rat's maze layout and be equipped with lots of anti-infantry weapons, and less anti-tank or longe bombardment ones. Yet, the anti-infatry weapons wouldn't give the IG the capacity to apply that fast attack doctrine they stand by.
I suppose that the spearhead is precisely meant to engage heavy armour, while the reserves and other intermediary lines are those which will deal with pockets of infantry and other urban shenanigans, which is perfectly understandable as that part of the IG is ponderous, which isn't much of a problem in a city. In a city, being a brick with gatlings is a good thing. It isn't in open environments.

And other bits.

?

And other elements I'm still reading, notably through small quotations provided in the USMC thread... I think. I'm not keeping tabs on each post where the stuff is posted though.
It isn't particularly important either because my point was that Deadguy's original conclusion was right. However, the claim he makes about modern doctrines and what can be observed about the "soviet" Imperial Guard is not something I would easily agree with.

There's the idea that the IG engages large amounts of power, concentrated if possible, and lets the reserve finish the job while the spearhead are here to weaken and divide the enemy force and preventing organization.
When the enemy engages his own mobile forces (which include missile launching platforms apparently), the IG's doctrine still gives it the initiative to force the enemy to a battle of attrition, where all units will be destroyed, instead of merely hitting the "nervous center".

Except the spearhead appears to cause the concentration not prevent it. Similarly it is this concentration which gives the slow, ponderous Guard its initiative. Namely it draws the enemy into easy reach.

The spearhead causes the concentration if the enemy can and engages all of its heavy forces. Otherwise, as said by the fluff, nothing can stop the IG's advance (as far as the IG has experienced).

Further how to square you conclusion with Deadguys:

Imperial Guard Codex 2nd edition lays out the origins of the Guard as a fast, hard hitting army.


The necessity of fluid and flexible warfare on the battlefields of the 41st millennium.

There's not much difference in large unit strategy between Soviet Deep Battle and modern doctrines.

That is more problematic, although one has to compare fully equipped IG regiments and the same for modern armies.
There's for example that imperial piece of equipment that helps sorting enemy units from tagged IG units. The implications due to the existence of such a technology are quite vast.
But if you want to get an idea of what the IG is capable of, then you'll probably already find lots of information in the SBC threads we talked about:

- Deadguy's thread.
- Ralson's thread.
- The IG vs USMC thread.

I can't go through all of them at once and copy paste every bit of data. I'm not even sure I have the will to spend my time on that stuff. I already postponed that reply. You'll find much more information on your own, and I suspect that by now, you already have.

The winter line was nothing fancy. The Pomerania Wall had strong points but the Axis forces here were just not enough.

You offered them as examples.

Yes, but as examples of lines allowing the defense to reorganize: they buy time, not necessarily stop the enemy once and for all. Of course, being outnumbered doen't help either but that wasn't part of the point I made.

Tanks require much more resources at every point of their existence, and as many men to work endlessly on their birthing and maintenance.

Considering, per General Donner, the Germans sank more money in their “line” than their armored forces I do not see how you can make this argument. All that fortification is expensive.

The Germans hardly had pushed their industry that far until mid to late 40. So on Donner's 1937 to 1941 range, that gives about a bit more than one real year of serious industrial production.
Now, I didn't see any mention on his part of maintenance costs. Just production ones.

It also doesn't take into account the type of units that would have been produced so early just before the war.

I believe it would really be interesting if we could compare ALL costs.

Here's some info about the Siegfried line:

http://www.mnhm.lu/pageshtml/siegfriedline.php

The Westwall, also known as Siegfried line, was a 630 km (390 miles) long defensive line. It spread from Weil am Rhein (on the border to Switzerland) to Kleve (on the border to the Netherlands) along the western border of the former German Empire. The Westwall had some 14,800 bunkers and 9,800 buildings. From those buildings, 5,800 were pavilions, 2,300 were fighting strongpoints and 1,700 were used for observation and for food and ammunition storage.

They planned to build 22,000 buildings in 12 years. The Westwall was thought of as a reminder of the ancient Roman border walls across Germania, the Limes Germanicus.

Building the Westwall had a very high priority. They used about 20% of the year production of concrete (8 million tons) and 5% steel of the year production (1.2 million tons). In addition they used 20 million cm3 stones and sand, as well as 100 million solid cubic meter of wood.
In the end, the cost was about 3.5 billion Reichsmark, which exceeded the capacity of the home budget.

The Westwall was built in three phases.

The planning of the construction started after Germany reconquered the territories around the Rhein in 1936. Individual bunkers would be built scattered along the line. From 1937 onwards, they began with the planning two of the three fortification systems. The first one, the “Limes Programm”, was situated between the Mosel and the Rhein, while the second system, the pioneering program, was in the Upper Rhine region. In 1938 they planed the third fortification system, the Aachen-Saar-Program, which had to defend the area of the Lower Rhine and the Eifel. In addition, the Luftwaffe built antiaircraft positions behind the Westwall in the Mosel-Rhein region. After the beginning of the war in1939, the construction of bunkers was continued, as well as the expansion of the Westwall in areas not yet built up. Firstly, the Geldern Emplacement lengthened the Siegfried Line northwards as far as Kleve on the Rhine. Secondly, they concentrated on the securing of the Orscholzriegel between the Siegfried Line at Mettlach and Luxembourg. And thirdly, the Spichern position on the heights south of Saarbrucken which was partially on French territory. In 1940 the expansion of the Westwall is slowed down and is completely stopped after the West Campaign. Because of the threat on the West German border after the landing of the Allies in Normandy on the 6th June1944, the Siegfried Line was reactivated. For the reactivation 20,000 forced laborers were used as well as the regional population. They had to work under bad working conditions and it often came to accidents. Up to 600,000 workers were occupied in this project at the same time. Altogether there were about 1.36 million people working on the construction of the Westwall under the direction of the Organization Todt.

In addition to various bunkers and fortifications, armored barriers were established for a better defense. The dragon teeth, also called pimples or Höcker, were constructions from steel and concrete which were assembled in a row.

The IG also has a reason to go for static defenses: its enemies barely evolve, power wise. As they have all plateau'd, they can count on the usefulness of layers upon layers of thick defenses that won't require as much maintenance (unless directly hit of course), than armoured divisions will.

Reinforced or plain concrete, padding, some sheets of iron if needed at some point and holes dug in the dirt cost little to nothing once there. They're also less complex to build and require less intricate resources.

I’m afraid you still are not comprehending the scale of your work. It isn’t remotely a one to one ratio between tanks and pillboxes. My one tank can cross your border at any point but your one pillbox can only guard its singular segment so you have to build all across your border to stop me. Then multiply that by the force needed to stop an actual, serious push to have an idea of what you’re putting down. Simply put massive fortified lines are resource intensive.

Please define "massive".

Forts of varying strength act as bastion-relays and, with modern firepower and balistics, can literally be used as launching platform before any tanks and other missile launching platforms can approach.
You can make a mobile missile launching platform, sure, but the fortress, being immobile, can have an even better system, and such structures aren't there to be bothered with technicalities about collateral damage in villages or towns.
They're there to lay down massive amounts of fire. They can project said firepower at longer ranges. Defense systems can already be present, protecting the fortress itself.
It also requires much less fuel than an entire armoured company, especially if you keep moving said company up and down along some virtual parallel line until you'd find a hole in the enemy's line.
Cost doesn't do all because there's also the problem of acquiring metal, and then again digging wholes or piling up dirt, reinforcing dirt, mixing dirt with some fancy archaic glue and else, and make packs of that stuff, is resource intensive but it also easier to obtain.

Regarding static defense, it is only recently that bunker busters have become so potent that bunkers are nearly useless unless massively reinforced, deeper and having some structure on the surface to deviate the trajectory of the falling projectile in order to nullify part of its potency due to sheer momentum.

I beg to differ. Taken from here:

"The most spectacular failure of the Belgian fortress system in World War II, and the most spectacular demonstration of the dominance of offense forces, was seen in the 1 day capture Eben Emael, possibly the strongest single fort in the world at the time."

WWII showed static defenses were old hat and ineffective.

You just forgot to mention that the fort was seized by paratroops after aerial runs, when they expected a land assault. ;)
Obviously when you think in 2D and your enemy thinks in 3D and can move in 3D, you're fucked.

I guess you also missed several other pieces of your document. It's much more of a mixed bag of statements than you make it seem to be.
For example, it bluntly states at the beginning:

"The existence of these barrier/fortifications systems did have strategic impact in all cases, and in most cases provided major tactical benefits to the defenders."

Then it mitigates the idea by stating that fixed defenses should be upgradable:

"Fixed investments in unchangeable obstacle components should be held at a practical minimum".

However, when you have time and men who can actually assemble a line of sturdy obstacles, trenches and other water-filled pits, there's no reason not to employ at expanding on the defenses you already have by adding those.
In 40K, it's quite obvious that huge defenses do work against heaps of firepower and enemy waves. The enemies are so weird and erratic in their behaviour that you cannot count on mere mobility to survive. Orks do stupid things. Chaos can spawn inside your ranks. Tyranids take time to arrive and let you build defenses but when they're there they drop from everywhere and in quantities and generally they still had genestealers to prepare the ground.
What the text most likely focuses on is that the current models of artillery pieces and in fact any other piece of machinery installed in the defense shouldn't be thought as the last ones, with the structure of forts uniquely built for them.
There's also the fact that modern weapons are a tad smaller for the same firepower or range, and can actually fit in the slots of old defenses. However, in the height of war, more powerful weapons just tend to be bigger, and thus your architecture screws with plans for shoe horning new pieces of artillery in tight spots.

And we're not speaking of insanely old ideas here, since the report itself dates back to 87 "only".
Further pages down, we get this (About french lines, from Vaudan to Maginot):

"During this period, the long shared border between France and Germany had been crossed by hostile armies many times as the two nations contested for the continental mastery of Western Europe. In most cases, these fortifications and barriers have not proven themselves equal to the hopes of their builders or of their owners during periods of actual combat. Despite this, as in the case of other fortifications to be discussed throughout this report, the existence of such barriers has often served as an unquantifiable deterrent against the initiation of hostilities, and as a strategic factor which altered the attacket's plans.

Though not may go as planned, they do work, and do have a large impact on how the enemy will operate. He cannot just ignore them, and this obviously both gives the defender time to organize as well as guess where the enemy will push his attack.

Even more, as an echo to what I said about delaying the attacker, we have this, in regards to the Sere barrier (the author quotes General Rivieres as the near "ideal statement of objectives for most such barriers", bearing some minor modifications):

"[it is] to create a barrier stretching from Calais to Nice, and behind it a general defensive scheme in depth as far as Paris... for the purpose of providing a cover during the mobilization, concentration and formation of troops in battle order, of controlling the invasion routes and of providing strong defensive points behind the barrier which would increase the strategic possibilities of the area without impairing freedom of operations."

So it's not just a line and goodnight.
Heck, the author goes as far as to say that what became an issue in French military doctrine around late 19th century was a love for offensive and that they let their defenses deteriorate, perhaps as much as their knowledge about them as well. And then, post WWI, they literally went the whole other way round.

Later, the author states that the barriers were "designed to be outflanked". Which also serves, imho, to create artificial chokepoints.

That document is really good, and we see that the Maginot Line suffered from bad maintenance and defective ammo.

See, to this day, you can pick some dumb bomb design, strap some JDAM and voila!
Now, picture doing the same with the ammo actually not working properly, sometimes remaining stuck on the plane...
I must say that despite the tragedy this war was, reading this had me laugh. You can picture the French shell fired at the German positions, only for the shell to hit the frozen ground a dozen meters in front of the German troops and continue gliding "hundreds of yards" before stopping, all with the Germans puzzled, then laughing and going WTF?

The line was designed to stand for 3 weeks. As the author points out, the surrender came 7 weeks later.

Regarding the Bar-Lev line, it failed because it was not sufficiently manned and not updated in order to prevent the Egyptians from acquiring intelligence regarding the reserves the Israeli held. That barrier basically was all things gone wrong in "War Barriers 101", and yet it still delayed the Egyptian forces.

As for the Finns, they performed like hell in the Winter War despite their low tactical defenses because they had exceptional natural defenses that did the job for them, and could focus their extremely outnumbered forces in very small chokepoints and evening the situation.

Last but not least, page 21 is a much needed conclusion to all that.
Take a look at the "tactical performance". It's immensively positive. However, in the "stratetical performance", they more or less all fail, and we see that it's not due to the inherent nature of the enemy they were designed to fight, but because of plenty of other reasons which the leaders didn't think of, or did but just didn't care about them enough.

Meaning that when your leaders aren't st00pid or when your enemy doesn't have a super duper trick card in his sleeve, barriers actually work.
The conclusion is that to rely on the barrier is the problem, because it also makes the enemy think while you actually sleep. In other words, the barrier is a clear advantage if the defensive team is also reactive, if not proactive.
Large preplanning from the attackers and a complete lack of surprise from the defenders is also a major problem.

It is also to note that decay would more strongly hit a force of vehicles (air, sea and ground) than an ensemble of fortresses where only the relatively much smaller mechanical elements require maintenance.
Indeed, the author strongly implies how maintenance of mobile forces is an utmost necessity.

In WWII, the most reinforced sections of the greater defensive lines were virtually undefeatable. The Maginot line's best forts were either taken down after a massive concerted effort from the German forces (and at this point the French forces were just not operated, largely leaving the forts alone), or simply never taken down, with the French troops inside asked to surrender once the political authority fell.

Irreverent. The Line was broken through. As built the Maginot line was a failure.

It is not irrelevant. It shows that the key pieces of the line held. The failure is to be found in the time lag and refusal by some to maintain a barrier up to date and even ever puzzling to the enemy (as well explained in the last page of the report).
Besides, as per that document you clearly didn't read, the line was meant to have holes for the enemy to go through. The plan was just not that good because of the organization of armour on the Allied side, the complete change from offense to utter defense, political shenanigans which had the French want to fight in Belgium instead of defending a better built line on French soil and of course the complete ignorance of the move towards the Ardennes, when few pieces of tactical shit like the Finns used would have worked admirably well in massively delaying German forces, while at the same presenting them with a hole they'd have easily be tempted to go through. Plus the fact that the north segment of the line wasn't "sealed" as it should have been (that's largely due to politics as well, notably diplomatic relations with Belgium). The document you give shows that despite the mechanical problems the Maginot line suffered, it did extremely well for what it was intended to do and that the failure is actually largely irrelevant to the line.

Now there were design flaws in the line, but it still worked wonders for what it was supposed to do. Safe that the stupid large gaps, of course. Either you build a medium line that's going to let you build time by delaying the enemy in order to allow you to organize your forces, or you plan a full static defense, but you do it completely. The French central command's dogma was completely half arsed. There.

Previously you've been talking up the Line like it was some wonder, uber design that totally worked and it was only due to it not being extended that it had a problem. Now your saying the Maginot Line itself was poorly built but the idea behind it would have been valid?

Clearly, the regions where it was, we should say, "properly" built, proved to be extremely relevant. That they thought some big forts + croissants in Paris would be plain enough while infantry squads supported by *some* armour would do wonders is clearly part of the things we should look into. It's also that after WWI (and because of other reasons I won't talk about here) they just didn't want to fight. Which generally equals = shot in the foot.

Then, we get back to the point of evoluion. People say that money should have been saved to build tanks and planes. They just forget that when the line was started and finished (~28 to 35), the vehicles built then would have been more of the same level of shit that didn't suffice. No radio, no real armour, no heavy cannons, and all the other deficiencies of that time. In other words, massive amounts of wasted money and metal.

Assuming they hadn't sunk their money in the "Line" they could have invested in their tank development more leading to tank designs more comparable to the Germans, better motorized their infantry, etc. Further the primary failure of France wasn’t material, their tanks were bigger and heavier than the Germans after all, but of doctrine.

If only you can prove that more money = we get best ideas earlier.
I don't see any correlation here, notably, I don't see any reason why more money would have suddenly made the French think "of ze course! we need more Dakka on turretz".
They just didn't have the idea, their tanks and planes were largely untested in what would be modern war.
What we see is that for a line built before WWII, it did admirably well where it was built (and used) according to plan, despite being already several years old.

The evolution of designs and doctrines was quite rapid during WWII. On that note, your document makes an interesting note about the Yom Kippur war, and how the Egyptians went for a war of... attrition (page 17).

The real "gems", the B1s, were too slow to come. Although that alongside the Brits' Matilda II, they were true beasts. I mean, 60 mm or armour on the front, nearly as much on the sides (and they even had a planned flank armour of 70 mm O_O'), plus the front cannon which many German tanks lacked.

They were too heavy, too slow.

It needn't be faster nor lighter. Its firepower and armour were what made it good. Its frontal 75 mm gun was in line, logic wise, with the idea that it wouldn't be the fastest thing on earth, but would act as a "sniper" and at the same time be able to withstand counter fire.
Anti-tank mobile howitzers weren't a stupid concept.
Not to say that the vehicle was being updated. Perhaps some future variants would have traded horsepower for less armour. We can't tell, it's all speculation.

D2s would likely be your better bet. Still slower than a Panzer III but comparable armor and cannon without the expense of the B1's. Give them a half way decent doctrine and infantry which support them rather than the other way around and you could do some damage.

The light tanks would just serve against equally very light units. The ammo used in 47 mm guns wasn't good enough and could only go through 25 mm armour. Needless to say, the tank could withstand its own fire.
In WWII, more powerful units were being devised, so the D2 would have only be relevant to its dwindling niche. Even the rather similar 47 mm gun on the B1 was improper and would have probably evolved back into a lighter anti-infantry cannon and a heavy machine gun, to protect the tank while its fixed gun was tearing holes in enemy armour.

Outside of any strategical considerations (the bluff of Group C near the line), the point is that the line was largely avoided precisely because the German forces would have broke their teeth on it and that would have been completely detrimental to their strategy, which was absolutely required considering the real "quality" of German tanks back in 40.

That's your speculation. The Germans went around the "Line" because that was the easiest, most efficient route they could find. That doesn't mean they would have "broke their teeth" going through.

There's no speculation. Check the specs for their tanks of early 40. A frontal assault on the Maginot line's tough sections would have been completely stupid. They also couldn't know in advance that their focused, full metal & lightning strategy would work through the north of Europe.

What made them superior was the ubiquity of radio through all mechanized units, even the smallest, and the dissociated driving and aiming of the main cannon. But not their firepower or armour.

Yes. I am aware of this. That is the whole point. The Germans were materially weaker than their opponents, that opposed to lacking in preparation or material the Allies held a distinct advantage in most categories and it was only because of the more effective operations by the Germans which allowed them to prevail. Essentially, condensing to very crude points, the Germans utilized speed and concentration of force to dictate the terms of engagements that they fought and evade the rest while moving behind their opponent’s lines faster than they could react.

Absolutely.
However, by comparison, and to remember what Deadguy pointed out and said in his first two posts, the IG also has tank squadrons, not mere armour units dedicated to the support of infantry.

As you can see in the article, the vast majority of the "forts" to fell were actually small structures, many located along the weakest sections of the line. Many forts were taken by the "simple" action of infantry, even on completely open lands.

Which doesn't alter the fact the German got through. So unless I'm missing something it is quite possible they could force a wedge through the Line and drive through initiating Blitzkrieg.

A wedge through the mostly paper tissue sections of the line, which wasn't even defended in a way to meet a spear head of full armour (what the Germans used, and which is so similar to the fluff descriptions).

This position needs refinement. Aside from the idea that quantity is a quality of its own, the German forces were much more "modern warfare" than anything the Allies came with. So only a swarm of armour could hope to compensate the difference of efficiency and action-reaction. There's indeed a point when even fine tech and faster reflexes doesn't undo sheer overnumbering.
Now, I'm basing this on how they used the Allies, especially the French, used their units. Why I say moar tanks is to compensate for the deficiency in their doctrine. One of the main problems of Belgian and French forces was the composition of their divisions. The motorization was rather, err... not really homogeneous. Meaning that when things started to move fast, the lack of "elite" divisions and the generalization of the messy jack of all trades resulted in groups literally stretching. With the problem of communication endemic to the Allies' forces, this was a total disaster.
Meaning that unless we suddenly make all units better, a rather obtuse but mathematically correct way to even the problem would require multiplying the number of already existing units, so at least there would still be more of the best units of each group.
Now, the B1s were quite better and also had the radio.
I mean, it's either more numbers or a near complete revamp of the Allies or at least French and Belgian forces.
I guess you could equally go with the full revamp. All in all, both scenario are completely made up and, as I alluded to in my previous post, fantaisies.

The issue through is a large enough force, a large enough industrial advantage will win. That is not being debated. The question was if two rough parity, equal tech/numbers etc, would see a return to a stalemate. If one side has vastly more resources than the point is null.

Indeed, as seen with the Pormenian wall.
Only a massive bottleneck allows a semblence of fairness. :)

Besides, you wouldn't be building them or equivalents between 1928 and 1935. You'd be outputting more of the stuff that wouldn't win you battles, but only maintain control over... controlled space.

The Heinkels were used during the Battle of France. All I'm doing is building more of the tykes from any "money" left over from mobilizing my infantry.

The Germans themselves found the plane to suck. Are you saying that they'd suddenly decide to build more of something they considered to suck?

Are you portraying a fair scenario or not? Because all of this is a presentation of a win-win case.
You attack two distant points in the line; you break them.
Your planes attack; they can bombard the line, its fortresses and even get beyond the line, hitting anything soft and other key points for movement (bridges, etc.).

That's fine, but what is the point?
Why the defense doesn't possess mobile forces combining long range artillery, anti-tank guns and tanks and anti-aircraft pieces?
Why are the fortresses incapable of firing at the planes, and why isn't there anything behind the wall to shoot down the planes?

It’s a battle plan. No more, no less.

It is completely fruitless for the topic. You even recognized above that a massive advantage in resources makes the point null.

You mean the fact that they enter a battle of attrition, when their first armour lines meet equally potent armoured divisions, is a question of doctrine more than anything else?

Like I said it doesn't say armor. It says "Mobile forces".

The spearhead is heaps of armour, even some of it flying, as far as I've read.

And do we have any evidence that they don't try to outmaneuver their enemies?

You saw the quotes. The Guard is slow, ponderous. Their strengths are firepower and attrition. There is no evidence to support them outmaneuvering their enemy as a matter of course.

Slow and ponderous doesn't mean they cannot detach sections for greater mobility. Otherwise even the concept of fast attack and spearheads couldn't apply.
It also doesn't mean they can't split the ponderous beast to attack several points, soviet style.
Outmaneuvering is quite an old concept on Earth after all...

We haven't even proved that the IG can't do modern warfare, with all its advanced systems, when it can claim orbital or air superiority, thus benefiting a hawk's eye view of the battlefield.

I’m slightly confused. Initially it appeared we agreed the Guard fought interwar style and merely disagreed as to the cause. Now you’re arguing the Guard fights modern?

There's the problem that they clearly have equipment to fight in a much more modern way.
Their missile launching platforms are mobile and high ranged.
Their aircrafts, bombers and interceptors, can double as observers.
They have at least two types of fast deployment VTOL troop transports. Why would they even use those if not only the IG as a whole but every single subsection was slow and ponderous?
Their tanks visibly come with a whole computer suite.
Their ground units have a tag system and can scan for other infantry on the ground, even through walls.
They have armoured vehicles visibly designed for survival and mobility in trench warfare and others clearly indicating an emphasis on mobility, although less numerous, like some Chimera variants.

What I think is that their doctrine is to fight against legions of enemies where mobility isn't going to give them any advantage, and several STC tank designs also limit their options.
But they also have what it takes, at least on paper, to veer towards a more modern and flexible type of warfare, although it would require specialized sections.

We haven't figure out how data is managed at all.

No we haven't. We may never since it is unlikely we will ever deal with that in any depth. Like I said the best we can do is look to how the Guard fights.

It isn't sufficient, because the way they manage data gives a large amount of information about how fast they can be. Namely, is there a battle network and how it works.

They clearly opt for a more versatile and robust doctrine of numbers and massed numbers than trying to move and snipe, although they could do it if they had the appropriate sensor tech and network infrastructure.

Except, all things being equal, its not more versatile or robust. It’s a highly fragile and unwieldly doctrine. It has the virtue of being simplistic and if you have low quality troops but high volume you can argue it makes sense within your own deficient context.

The only area where the versatility doesn't go is absolute modern warfare, because we can't tell if they cannot dedicate sections of their forces to that kind of fast approach.

Notice that all their infantry can be carried by very mobile transports. These transports also carry very potent weapons. All these vehicles have at the very least radios, which is nothing inferior to the tech used in current "modern warfare".

No. There is much more to "modern warfare" than just having some radios. For starters it would need to demonstrated that they use those radios similar to how the Germans did to coordinate and focus their attacks.

Of course there is more (just like there's more text before and after what you cut and quoted).
The point is that there's a potential, and we haven't determined for sure what their true ceiling is.

Further more Germans circa 1940 had no "networks" beyond radios, something the Guard has as well, and they demostrated brilliantly manuver warfare. Simply put toys do not define doctrine but rather vice versa.

The IG has a problem with its STC. Well, not strictly "its", but the devices they get because of those blueprints. It's a point where resources influence strategy which, after a while, define the doctrine and it stays stuck here.
But that's for the overall rule. I'm still curious about the networked battle part, or why we should believe that US Modern Warfare would actually be more modern than a foe who actually has weapons in space pointed at your head.
In many ways, the current modern warfare could look terribly primitive to the IG when it's supported by a detachment of Imperial ships under the commandment of IG leaders on the ground.

Not only their ships can see everything and send back all information, but they obviously bust all satellites and all radar stations on the ground.

The issue through is they rarely if ever do this.

You know, when you look at the videos of real field action in Afghanistan, you realize that there's quite a fucking gap between the supposed super duper modurn wafur and what goes on, where enemies on the top of hills are either taken down by good old howitzers manned by several soldiers, busted by planes or choppas not being particularly subtle in their approach, and how infantry is stuck using very basic tactics and weapons which are nothing fancy at all.
Nothing really like multi-guided mortar shells, advanced anti-personnel ammo on range/time fuse, fancy grenade launchers, extreme division and fluidity of small fireteam with über initiative.

I'm getting a stronger vibe that the whole modern warfare sctick is nothing more than vulgar propaganda which is only supported by the sporadic use of shiny toys from time to time.
Same goes for the supposed low level of "combined arms" warfare in the Imperial Guard.
They literally have orbital warfare, beyond today's "Battlespace".
The only odd element here is the network-centric warfare and for some reason, when I see all those logic engines, cogitors, holographic renditions of battlefields, capacity to link all systems from tanks to shoot at a single Titan (even if it's forbidden), and other things I can't remember or don't know, there's quite some reasons to consider that the network could be here. Or should be here.

Would it prevent typical trench or WWII scenarios of desperate situations where all went wrong? No, I don't think so. In fact, as I said, fights against the insurgency in Afghanistan looks nothing fancy. You don't see any immense advantage gained by an information network, and yet there's quite a wide difference of power and resousrces between both sides.

Suddenly, the super advanced but massively fragile US army is blind and mute.

Actually both ground and air mobile radar systems would still be up as should be radio communication. Further US doctrine and training ensure each soldier is far more flexible and capable of “rolling with the punches” than a Guard equivalent.

Perhaps. Perhaps not, I don't know much about IG training, although to me it seems rather fast and good enough to let you carry guns and shoot if you're aiming for infantry. But obviously being a driver, tank shooter or pilot would require more training.

The question would be how both sides would far without orbital support. And if all orbital advantages are removed, where do we go? Both sides have radars (and perhaps the IG would have an advantage if we have confirmation that they'd use some kind of subspace). Both sides have very potent ballistic fire.

The problem seems to be one of logistics and resources. Like, when the IG really is fully operational, pristine and all that.

To me, the IG doctrine is robust because it will work very well on worlds where neither forces can have total orbital superiority.

And I would counter that it wouldn’t work well or at all against any world with Modern doctrine even if all other variables, tech and numbers, were even. That it is too slow tempoed, to rigid and reliant on a top heavy command structure.

It all boils down to how the IG deals with is data and ground organization.
I tell you we really need to get clear on that. It's the only element that makes a complete difference, that of data accuracy, treatment and responsivity.

It turns out that the context is extremely important.

And I fail to see how the context changes anything.

For all the reasons one war will not look like the other. The parameters are so numerous, I won't even bother listing them. :)

The guides and quotations really give general ideas, but for the moment I'm yet to read something that goes into details as to how the IG behaves depending on the nature of the target, its defenses, its mobility and networks, and the null, partial or complete control of space or air.

Well if you find anything let me know.

OK.

This is where we should be looking at a variety of battle cases. If you want to properly cover your topic, that's what will happen one day or another. How much have you read of the fluff or novels?

Mostly the Cain books and why I feel the Guard could fight 40’s style if they got their druthers up. For instances:
“The last thing I found was a drawer full of com-beads no doubt intended to let survivors of a crash landing explore their surroundings without loosing touch with one another” Page 87 Defender of the Imperium omnibus.
The above in reference to an random escape pod Cain, and Jurgen, had accidently been jettisoned in implying com-beads are fairly common. Further we get this as a footnote by Inquisitor Vail :

“…as combeads are intended for short-range use only, typically between the members of an Imperial Guard squad.” Further reinforcing common usage as well as their inherent limitations. Ironically it mentions combeads work better with the infrastructure found at the regimental level through later in the story Cain was, just, able to communicate across a town to a backpack vox so “infrastructure” may be a loose thing in the Guard.

I'm actually worried about the size and limitations of their backpack vox design.
What I found really shows that doctrine, in 40K, follows technical limitations deeply engrained into the Imperium.

But I'm sure that equipment for vehicles such as transports, tanks, titans and then large industrial structures with a modicum of automation require admech and their voodoo.

And as far as I know, while they have to be blessed and sanctified by the Admech, “activation runes” are buttons which can be operated by anyone. Going back to the Defender of the Imperium omnibus page 85 we have this:

“With a little ccautious experimentation was enough to prove he could[drive] with almost as much elan as he handled the Salamander I habitually requisitioned…” This in reference to Jurgen Cain’s aid and driver driving Ork buggies they’ve captured. At no point is it suggested a techpriest would be needed to start said vehicles, or the command Salamander Cain usually is driven in, through Cain does make a snarky comment about how they would try and exercise the machines.

But they're ork buggies? :|
Anyway, even if technically the techpriests' voodoo stuff isn't need, they sure as hell believe they have to stick to it and apply it everywhere if things have to go by the book, otherwise they wouldn't bother.
So what Cain does seem to be a thing he allows himself to do when alone, without the whole administration's eyes to make reports on any odd behaviour.

In comparison, the percentages of soldiers who had been badly or underequipped on all sides was staggering during the beginning of WWII. The Imperium's industry is quite robbust there.

Isn't that more determined by the foes they fight rather than the Imperium. I mean if there is an example of the Imperium encountering an enemy whose tanks could buff Imperium anti-tank weapons and they turn around and whip out an improvement that would be impressive. Something we could make comparisons to Germany during the war for instances, who ran repeatedly into this problem, or the US. As it is I don't see anything really to make a comparison.

I guess the IG's typical solution will be to bring more firepower. They do have it, but in lesser quantity. Surely, meltas won't be a standard.
But on the other hand, I doubt lasrifles would still be issued if they were completely useless. Their ressources would probably be spared to get lasguns manned by two or three soliders instead. Especially if 40K is very static.

[sonofccn]

If the objectives are vital, then there is the possible implication that merely going blasting forth won't do them any good until some beachhead can be established.

The issue through isn’t so much that there are times when it is tactically-strategically needed to capture something but that it is a extremely spectacular omission via the Codex in describing the Chimera with an odd focus on what should be peripheral.

What I mean is that if there's no such intermediary vital target to seize, then it means the IG could indeed push its assault as deep as it could.

Except the text doesn’t speak of anything like that. It speaks of them taking and holding objectives in wait for the rest of their army. That doesn’t speak of maneuver warfare.

Only if you disregard the other quote, which shows us that unless the IG meets equal armour, it will storm through the enemy's forces

Mobile forces. As well I don’t think Chimeras were even mentioned.

That Chimeras become less effective isn't surprising. High firepower vehicles aren't meant for street struggles, where the environment naturally limits LOS while leaving a lot of opportunities to infantry to get close to the armour and blast them. Chimeras suited for long range combat couldn't deal efficiently with a close range warfare. They'd need to be refitted to match the rat's maze layout and be equipped with lots of anti-infantry weapons, and less anti-tank or longe bombardment ones.

I haven’t said anything regarding city combat so this talk of “street struggles” seem a little out of left field. As well the Chimera is an infantry fighting vehicle, its purpose is to disgorge troops onto the battlefield then support them, so it isn’t really a long ranged orientated weapon.

Yet, the anti-infatry weapons wouldn't give the IG the capacity to apply that fast attack doctrine they stand by.

Stand by? There is precisely a single cited bit of evidence suggesting the Imperium even knows what blitzkrieg is. We are far from establishing that their default tactic is some form of “fast attack”.

And other elements I'm still reading, notably through small quotations provided in the USMC thread... I think. I'm not keeping tabs on each post where the stuff is posted though.

I merely want all your evidence laid out. This going piecemeal stuff is taxing.

It isn't particularly important either because my point was that Deadguy's original conclusion was right. However, the claim he makes about modern doctrines and what can be observed about the "soviet" Imperial Guard is not something I would easily agree with.

Then we have a problem because Deadguy’s original conclusion IS about modern doctrine. That is his conclusion. At best you could claim his evidence supports your conclusion but that wasn’t Deadguy’s point.

The spearhead causes the concentration if the enemy can and engages all of its heavy forces. Otherwise, as said by the fluff, nothing can stop the IG's advance (as far as the IG has experienced).

Mobile reserves. And if it can be so routinely stopped that the Guard plans around its failure and uses it to merely concentrated the enemy so they can grind them down with attrition it isn’t a textbook example of Deep Battle. Your doing it wrong, perhaps like General Donner pointed out due to the small size being talked about, and shows the extreme opposite that they are a fast, mobile, maneuver centric army.

That is more problematic, although one has to compare fully equipped IG regiments and the same for modern armies.

The Imperial Guard are not poorly supplied within the context and limitations of the Imperium through. But Vraks saw a fully supported and supplied army and it was the slowest, most WWI army possible.

There's for example that imperial piece of equipment that helps sorting enemy units from tagged IG units. The implications due to the existence of such a technology are quite vast.

Implications unfortunately being the extent of the evidence presented. Bits of tech which if the Guard used in a certain way and if are widespread could do X. Now if you have an example of this tech being in operation I’ll change my tune but not until then.

But if you want to get an idea of what the IG is capable of, then you'll probably already find lots of information in the SBC threads we talked about:

- Deadguy's thread.
- Ralson's thread.
- The IG vs USMC thread.

I’ve read them. The problem is I didn’t find anything given by the pro-imperial side particularly useful. Most of it was vague, second hand reference or some obscure tidbit they furiously “massaged” to sound half way modern. Meanwhile Ralson has serried ranks of infantry and the talk that trench digging is still in common use.

I can't go through all of them at once and copy paste every bit of data. I'm not even sure I have the will to spend my time on that stuff. I already postponed that reply. You'll find much more information on your own, and I suspect that by now, you already have.

The issue through is the information I found supports my original conclusion.

Yes, but as examples of lines allowing the defense to reorganize: they buy time, not necessarily stop the enemy once and for all. Of course, being outnumbered doen't help either but that wasn't part of the point I made.

Then we are back to my point is that no wall has ever been built capable of truly stopping an enemy. Merely delaying.

[quote='Mr. Oragahn"] The Germans hardly had pushed their industry that far until mid to late 40. So on Donner's 1937 to 1941 range, that gives about a bit more than one real year of serious industrial production.[/quote] What does that have to do with anything? The Germans spent more on their wall than on the Army that walked over France. The exact percentage in relation to their industry is immaterial.

Now, I didn't see any mention on his part of maintenance costs. Just production ones.

Not specifically, depends on what “budget” was being talked about, but then again you haven’t offered any evidence as to the cost of that either.

It also doesn't take into account the type of units that would have been produced so early just before the war.

Most of those units would be trash. The Panzer III didn’t enter service until 1939 as near as I can tell.

I believe it would really be interesting if we could compare ALL costs.

You are free to crunch the numbers if you feel it will support your argument.

The IG also has a reason to go for static defenses: its enemies barely evolve, power wise. As they have all plateau'd, they can count on the usefulness of layers upon layers of thick defenses that won't require as much maintenance (unless directly hit of course), than armoured divisions will.

The problem is even assuming firepower is static it doesn’t stop force concentration, precise and directed air/ground artillery, etc from cracking your “layers of thick defense” like an eggshell.

Please define "massive".

The maginote line was what we were discussing around.

Forts of varying strength act as bastion-relays and, with modern firepower and ballistics, can literally be used as launching platform before any tanks and other missile launching platforms can approach.

Well against your “bastions” I’d likely first start with air to ground strikes, paratroopers, motorized artillery carriages with support of ground attack choppers and cruise missiles tech permitting. Then I’ll roll my tanks along with my mechanized infantry to finish up and push through.

You can make a mobile missile launching platform, sure, but the fortress, being immobile, can have an even better system, and such structures aren't there to be bothered with technicalities about collateral damage in villages or towns.

You have given thought to detecting and hitting my mobile platforms correct? Namely if it can be done in a timely enough manner my artillery piece can’t simply scoot away. In addition to being reactive to my actions which is typically bad in military thought, your thinking about what I’m doing while I’m thinking of what to do next, as well as the sheer number of systems I can expect to swamp you with.

They're there to lay down massive amounts of fire. They can project said firepower at longer ranges. Defense systems can already be present, protecting the fortress itself.

longer ranges of the same shell weight. Since I am not firing at shadows hoping to kill something but firing directed munitions I don’t need to waste space on explosives that will kill nothing but grass and harmless Civvies. Application of force, hitting what you intend to, is the bee’s knees my friend.

It also requires much less fuel than an entire armoured company, especially if you keep moving said company up and down along some virtual parallel line until you'd find a hole in the enemy's line.

Actually I don’t intend to move my army up and down your line “hammering” it like some WWI General hoping to make a breakthrough. Weaknesses are to be determined by recon and espionage rather than bloody minded futile assaults while my army stays “in reserve” layered to quickly and decisively respond to any aggression which you might make. Units will also be systematically taken from the “line” to be briefed and trained on their specific segment of the assault, playing against mock ups and the like, and when the time comes I will marshal my forces for a killing blow.

Cost doesn't do all because there's also the problem of acquiring metal, and then again digging wholes or piling up dirt, reinforcing dirt, mixing dirt with some fancy archaic glue and else, and make packs of that stuff, is resource intensive but it also easier to obtain.

Costs would represent the rough value of all those resources such as man-hours and dirt digging. As well I feel I should point out that you haven’t really touched the whole length and breadth argument I made. That you have to build something that can stop my entire army cold and then stretch it out hundreds if not thousands of miles.

You just forgot to mention that the fort was seized by paratroops after aerial runs, when they expected a land assault. ;)
Obviously when you think in 2D and your enemy thinks in 3D and can move in 3D, you're fucked.

If your fortress can’t repel light infantry there is something wrong with your underlying assumption.

I guess you also missed several other pieces of your document. It's much more of a mixed bag of statements than you make it seem to be.

Nope. I read it all. Especially the bit where the “best” defensive line was a two bit half-arsed thing thrown up to delay the Soviets.

For example, it bluntly states at the beginning:

"The existence of these barrier/fortifications systems did have strategic impact in all cases, and in most cases provided major tactical benefits to the defenders."

I have never said one couldn’t have tactical benefits and as towards strategic impact most of that either wasn’t good for the side that built the wall or like the Battle of France merely had the Germans go in another direction.

Then it mitigates the idea by stating that fixed defenses should be upgradable:
"Fixed investments in unchangeable obstacle components should be held at a practical minimum".

“obstacle components” is a far cry from the maginote line. Further from the conclusions part of the page:

“B. Wartime performance. Aside from the attacks and wars which were successfully deterred, however, the existence of barriers appears simply to bring forth sufficient creative ability on the part of the attackers to overcome the barriers, of whatever type. A pre-built peacetime barrier should be expected to hinder an attacker and cause him some additional casualties and effort, thereby providing a tactical advantage to the defender. However, it is dangerous for the defender to rely on the barrier to determine the outcome of the conflict”

So at best your defensive line will slow the attacker down buying you time to react and should be built and budgeted accordingly. It is not some war winning stratagem and those which relied on it to be such, like the French, get burned for it.

However, when you have time and men who can actually assemble a line of sturdy obstacles, trenches and other water-filled pits, there's no reason not to employ at expanding on the defenses you already have by adding those.

I don’t see how you could arrive at that conclusion from that paper. It pretty much flatly warns against over strengthening your line.

In 40K, it's quite obvious that huge defenses do work against heaps of firepower and enemy waves.

Ala the Great War.

The enemies are so weird and erratic in their behavior that you cannot count on mere mobility to survive

Neither of which makes being able to respond faster and more effectively any less potent.

Orks do stupid things.

Orks are stupid and prone to aggressive, unthought out actions. Multiple fast, mobile assault parties should be able to quite effectively harry, disrupt and disorganize such an unruly, undisciplined mob while denying them a static force they can collect their massive numbers against.

Chaos can spawn inside your ranks.

That’s equally true if they are sitting in a trench or not. Chaos corrupts, all you can do is maintain proper surveillance among the ranks for signs of taint.

Tyranids take time to arrive and let you build defenses but when they're there they drop from everywhere and in quantities and generally they still had genestealers to prepare the ground.

Being mobile would still better counter the Tyranids than sitting holed up in bunkers that can be isolated and taken piecemeal. As for Genestealers I’d recommend making DNA sampling mandatory for Service.

What the text most likely focuses on is that the current models of artillery pieces and in fact any other piece of machinery installed in the defense shouldn't be thought as the last ones, with the structure of forts uniquely built for them.

If you are referring back to the report and “Fixed investments in unchangeable obstacle components should be held at a practical minimum” he’s talking about the need to upgrade “obstacles” and considering the previous sentence he talks of them being placed “where and when they are needed” strongly suggests rather than static defense technology like forts he’s talking about obstacles you can rapidly place in the way of the invading enemy such as tank barriers or mines. For instance the Soviets during Kursk actually planted minefields in front of the advancing German tanks rather than just rely on mines planted before the battle. But yes every weapon employed should be designed with an eye towards periodic “upgrades”

And we're not speaking of insanely old ideas here, since the report itself dates back to 87 "only".

The report is from 88 I believe and no where does it remotely say that you should be doing anything like what you’ve been describing.

though not may go as planned, they do work, and do have a large impact on how the enemy will operate.

In the sense they did what they were designed to do no most of these lines failed. Making the Japanese go overland to attack you or making the Germans go through Belgium is meaningless if the ultimate result is you still lose.

Even more, as an echo to what I said about delaying the attacker, we have this, in regards to the Sere barrier (the author quotes General Rivieres as the near "ideal statement of objectives for most such barriers", bearing some minor modifications):

"[it is] to create a barrier stretching from Calais to Nice, and behind it a general defensive scheme in depth as far as Paris... for the purpose of providing a cover during the mobilization, concentration and formation of troops in battle order, of controlling the invasion routes and of providing strong defensive points behind the barrier which would increase the strategic possibilities of the area without impairing freedom of operations."

And taken as a general overview of intent I don’t see anything wrong with it. Rivieres is speaking of delaying the enemy, defense in depth and a strong mobile component rather than a series of ultra fortified lines as you’ve advocated.

So it's not just a line and goodnight.

Except you’ve been holding the Maginot line up as an example which was, relatively speaking, a line of forts rather than some elaborate defense in depth.

Heck, the author goes as far as to say that what became an issue in French military doctrine around late 19th century was a love for offensive and that they let their defenses deteriorate, perhaps as much as their knowledge about them as well. And then, post WWI, they literally went the whole other way round.

Which doesn’t alter his conclusions or my argument. There is nothing wrong with having some fortification but that is leaps away from some unbreachable super line which you’ve been talking about.

Later, the author states that the barriers were "designed to be outflanked". Which also serves, imho, to create artificial chokepoints

I’m having trouble finding that statement. Which segment is it in? Under the French Experience under “J” he mentioned the Maginot line was “Destined to be outflanked” but that’s it.

The line was designed to stand for 3 weeks. As the author points out, the surrender came 7 weeks later.

It was supposed to hold the Germans at bay for three weeks. Comparing the time it took for the Germans to run roughshod over France when the Line was, relatively, ignored can not be used to determine its value. In comparison I cited a document arguing the line was actually pierced by German soldiers in two days of combat.

Last but not least, page 21 is a much needed conclusion to all that.
Take a look at the "tactical performance". It's immensively positive. However, in the "strategically performance", they more or less all fail, and we see that it's not due to the inherent nature of the enemy they were designed to fight, but because of plenty of other reasons which the leaders didn't think of, or did but just didn't care about them enough.

The author is immensely charitable but yes some fortification can yield positive tactical results. Through even concerning oneself wholly with the tactical many of his examples still fell to enemy action if directly attacked, or were held at dire cost to the defender, the Finn example being the sole outstanding exception.

Meaning that when your leaders aren't st00pid or when your enemy doesn't have a super duper trick card in his sleeve, barriers actually work.

Not in the sense you are asking them to. As unbreakable siege lines that shall endure. Any attempt to do so is a waste of money which will merely hinder your actual army.

The conclusion is that to rely on the barrier is the problem, because it also makes the enemy think while you actually sleep. In other words, the barrier is a clear advantage if the defensive team is also reactive, if not proactive.

Which stands against the type of warfare you have advocated. You will not get Great War redux on steroids with tanks storming forth from giant castles of iron and concrete to wail on some one else’s fortress. It will be a cheaper construction more in depth meant to hinder not stop your invader, something which resembles Kursk more than the Maginot line.

Large preplanning from the attackers and a complete lack of surprise from the defenders is also a major problem.

Don’t you mean surprise instead of a complete lack? After all the attacker usually set the time and place of the attack giving them the element of surprise.

It is also to note that decay would more strongly hit a force of vehicles (air, sea and ground) than an ensemble of fortresses where only the relatively much smaller mechanical elements require maintenance.
Indeed, the author strongly implies how maintenance of mobile forces is an utmost necessity.

The report strongly cites the need for regular maintenance on fortifications just like every other bit of military hardware.

It is not irrelevant. It shows that the key pieces of the line held.

But they were supposed to stop the Germans not sit in uber fortress while France burned. You originally argued the Line held, that it worked where it had been built and the only issue was that they didn’t build it long enough. I have presented evidence the Germans cut through the Line. So even if the French had magically extended the line across the entire border the Germans could have just gone through and caught the French totally unprepared just as they did in the OTL.

The failure is to be found in the time lag and refusal by some to maintain a barrier up to date and even ever puzzling to the enemy (as well explained in the last page of the report).

What “Time lag”. And perhaps the “refusal” to maintain the barrier has to do with the extensive pricetag in doing so rather than merely stupidity. And I’m not sure what “ever puzzling to the enemy” is supposed to convey. The report speaks of barriers being a puzzle problem to your enemy, which can have a deterrent factor as your enemies try and find a solution, is that what you are trying to reference?

Besides, as per that document you clearly didn't read, the line was meant to have holes for the enemy to go through.

Look. I don’t mind being disagreed with. But I will not stand for puking assertions such as the above. I fight honorably bringing facts and information honestly as I see them to win my argument. If you think I overlooked something or didn’t give something its due you are free to cite it and support your argument. But you will not insinuate I have done anything untawdry merely because I do not agree with your conclusions. Do I make myself crystal clear?

As to the matter at hand please cite how the Germans went through an area of the line they were supposed to if that is your argument.

The plan was just not that good because of the organization of armour on the Allied side, the complete change from offense to utter defense, political shenanigans which had the French want to fight in Belgium instead of defending a better built line on French soil and of course the complete ignorance of the move towards the Ardennes, when few pieces of tactical shit like the Finns used would have worked admirably well in massively delaying German forces

Most of those problems you cite are because of the Line or the mentality which built it. Had they pulled a Finn they’d likely would have been better off but instead they went all siege and it cost them.

Plus the fact that the north segment of the line wasn't "sealed" as it should have been (that's largely due to politics as well, notably diplomatic relations with Belgium). The document you give shows that despite the mechanical problems the Maginot line suffered, it did extremely well for what it was intended to do and that the failure is actually largely irrelevant to the line.

The paper is charitable to the Maginot line but in the end his conclusions do not point towards the Maginot line being the defining example of defense.

Clearly, the regions where it was, we should say, "properly" built, proved to be extremely relevant.

So your not just extending it you want to mammothly beef up the thing, adding the Lord knows to the price, and yet your claiming it’s the cheaper alternative?

That they thought some big forts + croissants in Paris would be plain enough while infantry squads supported by *some* armour would do wonders is clearly part of the things we should look into.

As far as I can tell this jives with your argument. Big forts= impervious leading to Great War redux. If you want to move to elastic more modern defenses that’s fine but it won’t be the scenario you’ve talked about.

If only you can prove that more money = we get best ideas earlier.

Well you’ll never win unless you try. It certainly wouldn’t have hurt their chances.

I don't see any correlation here, notably, I don't see any reason why more money would have suddenly made the French think "of ze course! we need more Dakka on turretz".

Actually that would be stupid and ineffective. They already have plenty of Dakka. Instead, had they focused on an offensive/mobile fighting force, they could have built slightly faster tanks supported by vehicle mounted infantry. Plus doctrine to use it.

They just didn't have the idea, their tanks and planes were largely untested in what would be modern war.

It isn’t like they were facing harden 1944 veterans here.

What we see is that for a line built before WWII, it did admirably well where it was built (and used) according to plan, despite being already several years old.

It was mostly left alone for the duration of the War having no real effect beyond perhaps forcing the Germans to go around it. Even then, from what I’ve been able to gather, the Germans actually penetrated the line defeating its entire purpose. So on the ledger of its cost, man-hours and absorption of resources I would estimate its tactical value was too limited to be considered a worthwhile effort. Tanks, planes and trucks would have been a better investment.

It needn't be faster nor lighter. Its firepower and armour were what made it good.

On paper. In an actual war strategically it lost to Panzer III’s and IV’s. Much as winning the odd eleven to one odds make great ego stroking material I’d prefer a tank that can be produced and transported in sufficient numbers to fight all the battles. Same reason I prefer Shermans or a T-34s to King Tigers.

Its frontal 75 mm gun was in line, logic wise, with the idea that it wouldn't be the fastest thing on earth, but would act as a "sniper" and at the same time be able to withstand counter fire.

Which is great but if it can’t be moved in sufficient quantities quickly enough to engage your enemy its absolutely useless.

The light tanks would just serve against equally very light units. The ammo used in 47 mm guns wasn't good enough and could only go through 25 mm armour

The Germans rode in on tanks with only 50 mm guns and it was “good enough”. And the D2 was only four tons lighter than the Panzer III with possibly heavier armor. From wikipedia so always take it as you will but:

“The Panzer III Ausf. A through C had 15 millimetres (0.59 in) of homogeneous steel armor on all sides with 10 millimetres (0.39 in) on the top and 5 millimetres (0.20 in) on the bottom. This was quickly determined to be insufficient, and was upgraded to 30 millimetres (1.18 in) on the front, sides and rear in the Ausf. D, E, F, and G models,”

A retrofitted or variant with a slightly beefed up gun would be all you’d need to compensate for the slighter weaker gun.

In WWII, more powerful units were being devised, so the D2 would have only be relevant to its dwindling niche.

As opposed to the B1? A Breakthrough tank built for an arena which no longer existed. At least the D2 would be tactically flexible enough, with periodic improvements, until you built your next tank. Sort of like the Sherman and the Pershing/Patton tanks which followed.

Even the rather similar 47 mm gun on the B1 was improper and would have probably evolved back into a lighter anti-infantry cannon and a heavy machine gun, to protect the tank while its fixed gun was tearing holes in enemy armour.

Actually the B1’s likely would have ended up as semi-mobile pillboxes. It simply wouldn’t be able to compete in the arena of WWII.

There's no speculation.

If you have statements made by the Germans that they would have broken their teeth against the Line please cite them.

Check the specs for their tanks of early 40. A frontal assault on the Maginot line's tough sections would have been completely stupid.

An assault will be more than just tanks, and most likely tanks will play a minor part in the breeching action any way, and is unlikely to be so obliging as to be directed into your toughest section.

They also couldn't know in advance that their focused, full metal & lightning strategy would work through the north of Europe

? No one can truly know the outcome to anything before it occurs. Are you trying to say the Germans might get cold feet?

However, by comparison, and to remember what Deadguy pointed out and said in his first two posts, the IG also has tank squadrons, not mere armour units dedicated to the support of infantry.

There is evidence they grasp the concept of concentrating tanks into spearheads yes. That is still far and away from blitzkrieg.

A wedge through the mostly paper tissue sections of the line, which wasn't even defended in a way to meet a spear head of full armour (what the Germans used, and which is so similar to the fluff descriptions).

From here:

“The Maginot Line was widely believed to be impregnable, and for all I know there may still be those who think that the fortifications could have resisted any attack. It may be of interest to point out that the Maginot defenses were breached in a few hours by a normal infantry attack, without any tank support whatever” Now maybe Major General F.W. von Mellinthin is full of it or mistaken but with what little information I have the breach wasn’t some super armor push.

The Germans themselves found the plane to suck. Are you saying that they'd suddenly decide to build more of something they considered to suck?

No. I’m suggesting that is the best bomber the Germans will likely field within constraints of the scenario. Like I said I’d prefer B-17’s or B-29’s but you go to War with the army you have.

It is completely fruitless for the topic. You even recognized above that a massive advantage in resources makes the point null

How are we to discuss the subject if I can’t demonstrate/explain or show why I believe that my doctrine is superior to yours. And under the scenario under discussion I have been assuming equality of resources merely a difference in concetration.

The spearhead is heaps of armour, even some of it flying, as far as I've read.

We are not talking of the spearhead. We are talking about the concentration of mobile reserves which stops the spearhead.

Slow and ponderous doesn't mean they cannot detach sections for greater mobility. Otherwise even the concept of fast attack and spearheads couldn't apply.

The fact they are by bulk slow and ponderous, that their strengths are firepower and attrition etc paints a very clear picture. At best “fast attack and spearheads” form a minority of the Guard otherwise we would expect it to get mentioned when they are speaking in regards to the Guard.

It also doesn't mean they can't split the ponderous beast to attack several points, soviet style.

Well without the concept of Soviet "Deep Battle" they can't attack "soviet style". As well there is no evidence the Guard prefer or are truly designed to try and out manuver a foe. They are described as a ponderous force with focus on firepower and attrition. I'm sure tactically they'll out flank a foe if given half a chance but I'm not seeing anything that shows the Guard think along the terms of out manuvering their foe as a matter of course.

Outmaneuvering is quite an old concept on Earth after all...

And it would have been equally as old back during the Great War and interwar period and yet many armies from those periods placed emphasis on attrition and such.

There's the problem that they clearly have equipment to fight in a much more modern way.

Could but don’t.

Their aircrafts, bombers and interceptors, can double as observers.

Aerial observations date back to the Civil War however. For something modernish their needs to be a quick and strong cycle between said observers and ground pounders.

They have at least two types of fast deployment VTOL troop transports. Why would they even use those if not only the IG as a whole but every single subsection was slow and ponderous?

The question through is do we see the Guard using them as a mobile fast response units or as paratroopers or airborne dragoons?

Their missile launching platforms are mobile and high ranged.

Soviets used similar things unless your referring to the rare deathstrike. (Which is more V-2 in inspiration)

Their tanks visibly come with a whole computer suite.

Leman Russ’s have computers?

Their ground units have a tag system and can scan for other infantry on the ground, even through walls.

Possibly. At least in the Cain’s book sensor tech is scattershot.

They have armoured vehicles visibly designed for survival and mobility in trench warfare and others clearly indicating an emphasis on mobility, although less numerous, like some Chimera variants.

They have some vehicles which could be mobile if they decided to use them as such. After all the British were experimenting with putting infantry in tanks all the way back in WWI

What I think is that their doctrine is to fight against legions of enemies where mobility isn't going to give them any advantage

And here I would disagree that there has been any provided scenarios where being more mobile and faster than your opponent wouldn’t be an advantage.

But they also have what it takes, at least on paper, to veer towards a more modern and flexible type of warfare, although it would require specialized sections.

If we are talking strictly about technology and vehicles I wouldn’t disagree out of hand.

It isn't sufficient, because the way they manage data gives a large amount of information about how fast they can be. Namely, is there a battle network and how it works.

Well insufficient it may be but its what we’re stuck with until they print a book dealing with Guard network capability.

The only area where the versatility doesn't go is absolute modern warfare, because we can't tell if they cannot dedicate sections of their forces to that kind of fast approach.

Not really. Take Germany circa 1940 give them Leman Russes, ballisks and Chimeras and the like and they’ll stomp the Guard.

just like there’s more text before and after what you cut and quoted

If you believe I overlooked a vital part of your argument or dissected one too finely you may freely correct my mistake but don’t try and hide behind stupid comments like the above. I do my best to break your arguments down to their distinct parts through, to me at least, you have a rather fluidic arguing style.

The point is that there's a potential, and we haven't determined for sure what their true ceiling is.

Potential is meaningless for our purposes. It is not important how we might use the technology of the Verse but how the inhabitance use it. So a quote of them using radios proves that they have radios. Nothing more and nothing less. As I’ve argued before I will not waste calories trying to disprove things never stated or implied by the evidence.

The IG has a problem with its STC. Well, not strictly "its", but the devices they get because of those blueprints. It's a point where resources influence strategy which, after a while, define the doctrine and it stays stuck here.

And I would argue the reverse. They have been depicted with the technology needed to fight more modern then they do. Clearly the issue is not technological but doctrinal.

or why we should believe that US Modern Warfare would actually be more modern than a foe who actually has weapons in space pointed at your head.

Because you’ve dug nothing up to suggest otherwise. Since the US Army would not be described as a slow, ponderous force which relies on attrition to win engagements. Since the Guard still dig trenches even through most of the civilized world has moved away from static defense structures since the end of World War II.

You know, when you look at the videos of real field action in Afghanistan, you realize that there's quite a fucking gap between the supposed super duper modurn wafur and what goes on, where enemies on the top of hills are either taken down by good old howitzers manned by several soldiers, busted by planes or choppas not being particularly subtle in their approach, and how infantry is stuck using very basic tactics and weapons which are nothing fancy at all.

Having air support on “tap” is part of that “super duper modurn wafur” as well as the invisible flow of information which helps both the highest and lowest echelons paint a picture of what is happening.

Nothing really like multi-guided mortar shells, advanced anti-personnel ammo on range/time fuse, fancy grenade launchers, extreme division and fluidity of small fireteam with über initiative.

Frankly I think your too stuck on “toys”. Nor am I sure what you mean by “extreme division and fluidity” of small fireteams with uber initiative” Having the ability to call down a gunship/artillery/cruise missile to frag some pukes dug in on a hill is very fluid and effective way to deal with random encounters.

I'm getting a stronger vibe that the whole modern warfare sctick is nothing more than vulgar propaganda which is only supported by the sporadic use of shiny toys from time to time.

Well if that is your belief I’m not going to argue with you.

Same goes for the supposed low level of "combined arms" warfare in the Imperial Guard.

You are free to find evidence the Guard normally use and understand combined arms.

They literally have orbital warfare, beyond today's "Battlespace".

Which is separate and distinct from how they fight on the ground as the fluff shows. If you have evidence they routinely use orbital support, for intelligence gathering or tactical support, you may freely bring it up for discussion.

The only odd element here is the network-centric warfare and for some reason, when I see all those logic engines, cogitors, holographic renditions of battlefields, capacity to link all systems from tanks to shoot at a single Titan (even if it's forbidden), and other things I can't remember or don't know, there's quite some reasons to consider that the network could be here. Or should be here.

Ultimately how they use their toys is all that is important. And you have provided nothing to show they use them in the way you want. Hell most of this you haven’t even posted in this thread.

In fact, as I said, fights against the insurgency in Afghanistan looks nothing fancy. You don't see any immense advantage gained by an information network, and yet there's quite a wide difference of power and resousrces between both sides.

That’s likely because the Afghans went to a guerilla War, which while being mobile is a boon there isn’t the same infrastructure or concentrations to destroy as you’d find in a straight up battle, to try and avoid the whole us drop kicking them thing. A more apt depiction of the forces we are talking of, waging a conventional war, would be how we carved through Iraq.

Perhaps. Perhaps not, I don't know much about IG training, although to me it seems rather fast and good enough to let you carry guns and shoot if you're aiming for infantry. But obviously being a driver, tank shooter or pilot would require more training.

That isn’t quite what I meant. US troops will respond to the changing circumstances faster than the Guardmen will.

The question would be how both sides would far without orbital support. And if all orbital advantages are removed, where do we go?

This for starters. Do the Guard have a counterpart? Or this? What about UAV’s? Like the Raven?

It all boils down to how the IG deals with is data and ground organization.

Not really. If they had a really fast and joint linked command structure they wouldn’t get bogged down in trench warfare.

I tell you we really need to get clear on that. It's the only element that makes a complete difference, that of data accuracy, treatment and responsivity.

I think how they fight is slightly more important as a practical matter.

For all the reasons one war will not look like the other. The parameters are so numerous, I won't even bother listing them. :)

You have not stated a parameter which will make trench warfare suddenly a viable idea.

But they're ork buggies? :|

Yes. Ork buggies. Their still machines and Cain never even for a moment thinks Jurgen would need a techpriest to turn it on.

Anyway, even if technically the techpriests' voodoo stuff isn't need, they sure as hell believe they have to stick to it and apply it everywhere if things have to go by the book, otherwise they wouldn't bother.

Things have to be blessed and sanctified yes. Repairs and maintenance would need to be done by an Enginseer but simple use shouldn’t require anything more than a grunt.

So what Cain does seem to be a thing he allows himself to do when alone, without the whole administration's eyes to make reports on any odd behaviour.

Save Jurgen also drive his command vehicle when back in Civilization. I mean I have never heard they needed techpriests for each individual vehicle, what source are you getting this from?

I guess the IG's typical solution will be to bring more firepower. They do have it, but in lesser quantity. Surely, meltas won't be a standard.
But on the other hand, I doubt lasrifles would still be issued if they were completely useless. Their ressources would probably be spared to get lasguns manned by two or three soliders instead. Especially if 40K is very static.

I didn’t disagree that the Guard’s weapon were decent to kill what they fought. I merely questioned the comparison you were making.

[Mr. Oragahn]

Woah, too much to read atm.
I'll try to find some time to spend on this reading later on.
So what is the short version?

[sonofccn]

I found this paper concerning France and Germany interwar development and thought it might be applicable to our discussion.

[Mr. Oragahn]

Downloaded! thanks.